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ABSTRACT
This thesis will review the most relevant existing and proposed accountability
mechanisms for private development and security contractors coming out
of the human rights, public administration and anti-corruption fields. These
three fields were selected because first, they directly shape the policy dis-
course around contractor accountability. Second, they each have a different
emphasis or bias in their policy recommendations. Human rights advocates,
for instance, are largely concerned about applying legal frameworks to and
extending jurisdiction over private military and security contractors. Since
private development companies by and large rely on PMSCs in lieu of ad-
equate military security, this perspective is important to ensure development
contractor accountability. Human rights discourse thus, primarily emphasizes
legal accountability mechanisms.
The anti-corruption field focuses on political accountability mechanisms for
private contractors through initiatives to increase transparency and facilitate
better governance. Lastly, public administration discourse encompasses a
series of bureaucratic procedures and regulations that institutionalize ac-
countability mechanisms through reporting, database creation, and standard
operating protocols. In the human rights, anti-corruption and public adminis-
tration fields, there is a cross cutting emphasis on professional accountability,
whereby individual experts or firms are both internally accountable to a code
of conduct and externally accountable to their peers and industry partners.
But none of the existing American accountability mechanisms includes ac-
countability to beneficiaries. Accountability is embedded within a series of
relationships, whereby one party has the right to demand information, voice
their opinions in a public forum and have enough leverage to impose sanc-
tions or give rewards to another party. All present reform efforts however,
continue to reinforce upwards, monetary accountability to donors, while mar-
ginalizing the ability of beneficiaries to hold private contractors accountable.
The question this thesis will try to answer is: As American development
projects are increasingly contracted out to private actors in conflict
contexts, how should we reframe the concept and practice of "account-
ability" towards beneficiaries?
To my advisor Dr. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, my thesis
reader Dr. Alice Amsden, Lorenzo Deslegues, Dr. Pierre
Fallavier, Charles Semaris, Narinder Gupta, Sandy
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Explanation of Diagram
USAID primarily disburses funding through three mechanisms: Contracts, Cooperative
Agreements and Grants. The diagram illustrates some of the potential arrangements of
for-profit and non-profit firms with USAID. This does not mean that a company who gener-
ally receives cooperative agreements can not be contracted or receive a grant. This dia-
gram simply shows possible funding agreements as they have manifested in Afghanistan.
Each firm receiving project funding for USAID, tends to rely on a host of subcontractors for
various services, including project construction, monitoring & evaluation and conducting
risk assessments.
Though this diagram shows three tiers of subcontracting, in conflict zones, there can be
up to five tiers of subcontracting before project implementation. At each tier, the sub-
contractor extracts an overhead adminstrative costs (% of the contract). The greater the
number of contracting tiers, the harder it is for USAID to maintain visibility over who is
actually implementing the project. Each tier of subcontracting also means a delegation of
responsibility, relying on professional accountability to ensure the project is completed in
a timely and effective manner.
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INTRODUCTION
'Accountability' in the Modern
Development Enterprise
Crises and wars provide tremen-
dous opportunities to ask questions that
are generally overlooked in times of peace
and prosperity. What went wrong? Who was
responsible? How can we prevent such in-
stances in the future? Crises tend to shock
the bureaucratic, legal, professional and
political machineries into action-to hold
those responsible to account. Accountabil-
ity is thus, the default mode of discourse in
liberal democracies where "sovereignty lies
with the citizen, and authority must be held
to account."' Each successive crisis-such
as the 1986 Challenger space explosion,
the 1998 Clinton-Lewinsky scandal and
2007 financial crisis-prompts the creation
of congressional commissions, hearings, in-
quiries, laws, new bureaucratic safeguards
and varying degrees of sanctions. For the
purposes of this thesis, I refer to this crisis-
response system as The Accountability
Machine.
After a decade of engaging in two
theatres of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, we
find ourselves in the midst of a severe bud-
get crisis that has placed every American
agency relying on private security and de-
velopment contractors under close scrutiny.
Due to successive cuts in government per-
sonnel over decades, agencies have made
contractors the default option. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq have revealed to what
extent the gap between government capac-
ity and ever-increasing government respon-
sibilities have widened. The Congressional
Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC)
has found that "reduced government staff-
ing and increased government responsibil-
ity opened a breach into which contractors
have stepped. And a missing element in de-
cisions to contract has been the recognition
that increased reliance on contractors in-
creases the burden on government to man-
age and oversee them." 2
What the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq revealed is a longstanding trend in the
U.S. government to rely on consultants and
contractors to compensate for external
pressures to downsize-resulting in what
Christopher McKenna has termed the rise of
the "contractor state." Allison Stanger refers
to America as "one nation under contract,"
which promotes the practice of laissez-faire
outsourcing. She observes that "contract-
ing in conflict environments.. .amounts to a
stealthy whole-scale paradigm shift in the
core business of American foreign policy,"
which is indicated by how contractors "have
become prominent across the so-called
three Ds of defense, diplomacy, and devel-
opment, as well as in homeland security.4
As public functions-whether per-
formed domestically or internationally-are
outsourced to private actors, it calls into
question that exactly the "authority" is in
the phrase "sovereignty lies with the citizen,
and authority must be held to account." To
what extent can the government agency
effectively monitor private contractors and
ensure contractor actions are accountable
not only to the hiring agency, but also to the
public they serve?
These are the questions facing the
United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID), an agency notorious for
using contracts, cooperative agreements
and grants to implement all of its projects.
USAID has been specifically targeted for
fiscal reform, draconian cutbacks and even
dissolution by some marginal congressional
voices. Two days before her confirmation
as Secretary of State, on January 13 2009,
Hillary Clinton explained the challenges fac-
ing the agency:
BOX I
"THE ACCOUNTABILITY MACHINE" refers to a set of often iconic political, bureaucratic,
legal and professional processes western governments such as the U.S. employ in the wake of a
crisis or scandal (largely to restore voter confidence.) Accountability in this definition is based
on the premise that 'sovereignty lies with the citizen and authority must be held to account.'
BOX 2
"THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE" refers to the American international devel-
opment strategy that models itself on a cost-effective private sector model: Investments in
international development projects abroad will yield returns in the form of (1) the creation
of vibrant markets abroad to ensure our economic security, (2) prevention of weak states
succumbing to political violence, or even terrorism and (3) stabilizing current conflict-ridden
areas by targeting the root drivers of instability.The private sector model also supports the
continued use of private development contractors for both project implementation and proj-
ect monitoring, insofar as there is adequate oversight capacity in the agency.
I think it's fair to say that USAID, our pre-
mier aid agency, has been decimated. You
know, it has half the staff it used to have.
It's turned into more of a contracting agency
than an operational agency with the ability
to deliver.5
The systematic gutting of the agency's op-
erational budget has been strangely juxta-
posed with the Bush Administration's 2002
National Security Strategy that firmly placed
development on equal footing with the other
pillars of national security: defense and di-
plomacy.6 The 3 Ds operationalize devel-
opment as part and parcel to our national
security.
This characterization of development
as a security strategy was enshrined in John
F. Kennedy's words as he signed the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 that consolidat-
ed several international aid programs under
the newly created USAID:
The amount of money that is involved in the
nonmilitary areas are a fraction of what we
spend on our national defense every year,
and yet this is very much related to our na-
tional security and is as important dollar for
dollar as any expenditure for national de-
fense itself.7
In addition to justifying foreign assistance
on the basis of national security, JFK used
an economic calculation to equate invest-
ment in development as providing returns
for security. At the time, this was part of a
broader cold war strategy. Fifty years later,
this cold war calculation has not changed.
As Rajiv Shah,8 the current reform-
minded USAID Administrator stated a year
into his tenure, "I want the American tax-
payer to know that every dollar they invest
in USAID is being invested in the smartest,
most efficient and most transparent way
possible."9 His speech that day was entitled
The Modern Development Enterprise. Shah
has introduced USAID Forward, a bundle
of procurement, budgeting, evaluation and
policy reforms, in part to assuage Washing-
ton critics who point to reports of rampant
fraud, waste and abuse in the modern de-
velopment enterprise that he is seeking to
build. His administration has also initiated
the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan
(A3) initiative that seeks to mitigate fraud,
increase transparency and monitoring and
evaluation of projects to ensure aid effec-
tiveness. These types of accountability re-
forms are grounded in public administra-
tion debates about increasing government
efficiency and procurement management.
These will be evaluated in Chapter 4.
The evidentiary basis for introduc-
ing new USAID reforms comes from vari-
ous oversight agencies in the accountability
machine, such as the USAID-Office of the
Inspector General (O1G) and Special Inspec-
tor General for the Afghanistan Reconstruc-
tion (SIGAR), the Special Inspector General
for the Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). These
oversight agencies are institutionalized or
bureaucratized forms of political account-
ability, because they act on behalf of Ameri-
can taxpayers. They demand accounts on
agency expenditures through conducting
regular investigations and audits, and have
the power to enforce sanctions by referring
instances of fraud, waste and corruption to
the Department of Justice for appropriate
action. Their role in enforcing accountability
of development contractors will be evalu-
ated in Chapter 4.
Each of these oversight agencies
has testified to the excessive waste in the
reconstruction efforts before the congres-
sional Commission on Wartime Contract-
ing (CWC). 10 This commission was set up to
identify the reasons, scale and possible so-
lutions for the fraud, waste and abuse iden-
tified in wartime contracting practices. The
CWC is also a political accountability mech-
anism because it represents the interests of
American taxpayers. Unlike other oversight
agencies, it is not an institutionalized form
of political accountability because it was set
up in January 28, 2008 under a two-year
mandate to study wartime contracting. Its
series of congressional hearings, investiga-
tions and reports are meant to reveal deeper
structural problems with wartime contract-
ing that can inform future policy decisions
on contracting and contractor accountabil-
ity.
As indicated by the name of the com-
mission, the practice of contracting has
been at the heart of the US perspective on
reconstruction failures in Afghanistan and
Iraq. And yet, according to Shah, "every en-
terprise relies on contractors and depends
on them to succeed."" The logic of using
contractors may be questioned during the
CWC's hearings, but the practice of using
contractors remains unquestioned. The so-
lution lies in "managing" them better, even
showing them who is boss as indicated by
Shah's statement: "We do not work for our
contract partners. Our contract partners
work for us...'too big to fail' simply does
not exist in development."12 This strong lan-
guage is reassuring because it indicates a
real opportunity for reexamining the role of
private development contractors-to hold
them accountable.
The questions that remain unan-
swered, however are to whom should they
be accountable to and what does account-
ability even mean in this context? Shah par-
tially answers in that the modern develop-
ment enterprise is trying to improve how
it serves its "customers," the people of
the developing world. But 'service' cannot
stand in for 'accountability' in development
projects. Since developing world "custom-
ers" do not actually pay for development
services, they have no monetary leverage
to demand better service. The monetary
focus US oversight agencies often reduce
the much broader goals of accountability to
merely accounting.
Ashraf Ghani, the former Minister of
Finance in Afghanistan (2002-2004), cri-
tiques USAID's aid-delivery system from the
perspective of its customer. In a paper by
Ghani, Claire Lockhart and Michael Carna-
han, they describe how "during Dr. Ghani's
two-and-a-half-year tenure... he was never
asked to provide feedback on the perfor-
mance of USAID's country director - or in-
deed that of the director of any bi-lateral or
multi-lateral institution, or UN agency."13
The lack of aid coordination between
USAID and the Afghan government is fur-
ther illustrated by the fact that the Afghan
government had developed a National De-
velopment Strategy (ANDS) by April 2002,
whereas USAID did not prepare an opera-
tional strategy to integrate its efforts with
ANDS until mid-2005. Though Ghani et. al's
assessment of USAID/Afghanistan's overall
strategy is rather critical, their portrayal of
how USAID dealt with unaccountable con-
tractors is downright dismal:
USAID's contractors failed to deliver on
promises in sectors ranging from education
to infrastructure. The wider the gap between
promises and delivery, the more expensive
service delivery became. Sometimes a con-
tract was reported as passing through five
nested layers of American contracting firms
- each of whom charged a substantial fee
- before reaching an Afghan sub-contractor
who actually built a structure. A school cost-
ing USAID $250.000, for instance, would be
built by an Afghan sub-contractor at a cost
of $35,000-50,000. As complaints about
lack of progress and poor quality increased,
USAID reportedly hired even more organiza-
tions to oversee those organizations already
hired to monitor and report to it.14
In fact, Ghani comments that "every $1 in
cash from a program loan (either from the
World Bank or Asian Development Bank)"
is equivalent to $8 in USAID financing.15 In
light of Ghani's criticism, which presents it-
self as the 'Afghan customer perspective,'
how do we reconfigure what Shah means
by USAID's service to its customers - the
people of the developing world?
Accountability in American develop-
ment efforts is framed within the boundaries
of the state. When a state however, inter-
venes in a foreign nation through war, oc-
cupation or state building, that state-centric
framing of accountability does not change.
This is evident in how the US government
has responded to the ongoing crisis of cor-
ruption and human rights violations in war-
time contracting, which will be further dis-
cussed in Chapter 1.
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Ef-
fectiveness introduced the idea of Mutual
Accountability between partner countries
and donors.16 This desire to harmonize how
donors and partners assess the impacts of
aid was a response to the largely uncoordi-
nated, and often competing agendas of do-
nor institutions and aid recipients. The Paris
declaration attempted to forge an equal
relationship between the donor and recipi-
ent country, so that each could be held ac-
countable to the other.
The United States and Afghanistan,
both adhere to the declaration, along with
prominent international organizations like
the World Bank and the UN Development
Group. But it remains unclear how the Paris
declaration can be applied to state-building
and reconstruction efforts in active conflict
zones. When a transitional state requires
bought-in capacity in the form of develop-
ment contractors and consultants to provide
even the most basic services to its popula-
tion, then how can that state be on equal
footing with donor agencies and states to
demand accountability?
In Ghani et. al, it became clear that
the postwar, emerging Afghan state had
very little say in influencing USAID's pro-
grams between 2002 and 2005. Moreover,
even though USAID regularly claims that
there is not enough local human capital and
state capacity to properly administer the
large amounts of USAID funds, Ghani et. al
point out "since USAID had neither an op-
erational strategy, nor a performance-based
management system, it could hardly be a
model of accountability, effectiveness, and
transparency to emulate." 17
Though this may appear as mere
bickering or even a struggle to claim sover-
eign rights over directing the development
effort, especially during a post-conflict de-
cade both foreign aid agencies and national
governments are trying to build up capacity
to effectively administer projects. The more
salient accountability question, beyond
mutual accountability as defined between
donor and partner country, is whether it is
possible for individual civilians, groups or
states-as the targeted beneficiaries of de-
velopment projects-to hold donors and
implementers accountable?
Accountability does not exist in itself.
It is a construct-a product of the human
imagination. It is embedded within a se-
ries of relationships that impose rights and
obligations on different groups. As certain
groups gain power and exercise undue in-
fluence over the welfare of other groups,
accountability mechanisms are introduced
to not only safeguard against any abuse of
power, but also to legitimize the holders of
power. As Melvin Dubnick explains, "within
the context of social transactions, it [ac-
countability] emerges as a way for individ-
uals to relate to one another-an ongoing
process of account-giving and account-tak-
ing that is fundamental to the development
and maintenance of trust."18
Within an accountability-relationship,
each party has the right to demand informa-
tion, a right to a forum where opinions can
be openly voiced, and adequate leverage to
demand remedy by imposing sanctions. To
what extent-if any-do developing world
'customers' have a right to information, pub-
BOX 3
Human Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights,Article 8,"Everyone has the right to
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law."
Anti-Corruption Transparency International, "Corruption is operationally defined as the
abuse of entrusted power for private gain."
Public Administration Center for Public Accountability, "Public accountability means the
obligation of authorities to explain publicly, fully and fairly, before and after the fact, how they
are carrying out responsibilities that affect the public in important ways."
BOX 4
Accountability Challenges for Contractors in War
(I) Multiple tiers of contracts and subcontracts diffuse responsibility for project outcome
among numerous actors and relying on a complex web of accountabilities to get the project
done, (2) Insecurity and perceptions of insecurity, which decrease monitoring and evaluation
visits, duration of the visits and increased security costs of the visit, (3) The combining of se-
curity and development objectives can be a hindrance to trust building between beneficiary
groups and project implementers.
lic forums and remedy from their donors?
Even when accountability to end beneficia-
ries is lauded as a development objective,
it is quickly sidestepped in the emergency
conflict and postwar context where the state
is considerably weakened or nonexistent.
Human rights, anti-corruption and
public administration discourses all declare
the state or public organ as the protector
of individual and group welfare. This also
means that the state is accountable for hu-
man rights violations, corruption and irre-
sponsible public administration.
It is first, important to understand that
the sovereign state and its public organs are
at the center of each of these disciplines,
because this poses several challenges for
holding private contractors accountable.
The pursuit of human rights is expressed in
the language of the state: the law. It is not
even possible to have a case of corruption
without an "entrusted power," or what is
more commonly understood as a public of-
ficial. And public administration is itself an
articulation of the state and thus, account-
ability becomes a form of governance when
"there is a sense of agreement about the le-
gitimacy of expectations among community
members." 19
This state-centric notion of account-
ability means that the state must hold pri-
vate contractors accountable for their ac-
tions, on behalf of the public they serve.
In the American context, this refers to the
American citizen and taxpayer. In lieu of a
strong Afghan state with adequate jurisdic-
tion and capacity to hold private contractors
accountable on behalf of the Afghan people,
accountability to end beneficiaries cannot
be a priority. This suggests that a state-
centric notion of accountability in postwar
reconstruction and development projects is
unable to address accountability to benefi-
ciaries.
Though the American public can le-
gitimately hold private development con-
tractors accountable, those contractors
operating in Afghanistan are not directly
serving the American public. The future
projected benefits of economic and global
security may be what garners support for
annual budgetary requests, but the direct
beneficiaries of these development projects
are the citizens of Afghanistan. In light of
this obvious, though politically marginal rev-
elation, accountability must be reconfigured
as a series of relationships between the
American state, American citizens, Afghan
state, Afghan citizens and the private de-
velopment contractors, or more likely their
subcontractors. Mutual accountability, as
articulated in the Paris Declaration, cannot
just be superficially limited to 'donors' and
'partner countries,' but it must encompass
the broad array of actors that actually do the
work of development.
As the American state continues on
a path of overreliance on contractors-what
the CWC deems the "default" mode of op-
eration-we can no longer have faith in ac-
countability rhetoric, existing legal sanc-
tions in the form of fines and suspensions to
ignore the real consequences that actions of
private contractors have on the populations
they are hired to serve. The purpose of this
thesis is not to assign blame to private con-
tractors, because the growth of the private
development industry has been in response
to government agencies growing demand
for contractors. Contracting has however,
diffused responsibility for project outcomes
among a complex web of for-profit and
non-profit actors. Development agendas
and budget priorities are set in Washington,
D.C., while funds are disseminated through
hundreds of implementing partners working
in challenging, conflict contexts. This means
that the present modern development enter-
prise does not want to or cannot enter into a
direct relationship with its beneficiaries.
This thesis will attempt to evaluate
the existing web of accountability mecha-
nisms that target private development con-
tractors (and the private security contrac-
tors they hire). One of the recurring and
pestering questions that emerged in the
course of researching and writing this thesis
is whether it is even possible to conduct ef-
fective development work in conflict. Based
on interviews with Afghan NGO workers, in-
ternational contractors and US military per-
sonnel, it seems that "effective" is simply
an unachievable goal. Security risks, lack of
local capacity, contractor fraud, opportunis-
tic insurgent and patronage networks are all
cited as conditions that make reconstruc-
tion and development work untenable and
often unsustainable.
Despite this knowledge, develop-
ment practitioners continue to pursue proj-
ects in conflict contexts either due to in-
ternational aid flows, or perhaps their own
desire to help vulnerable populations in
spite of challenging conditions. This thesis
neither endorses the use of private devel-
opment contractors in conflict zones, nor
champions the undertaking of complex and
ambitious reconstruction and development
enterprises without adequate security. The
project of holding development contrac-
tors accountable to the beneficiary popula-
tions they are hired to serve is a mitigating
response to a largely dysfunctional modern
American development enterprise at war.
Chapter 1 "The Accountability Machine and Pri-
vate Contractors" will posit a local accountability
scenario in Afghanistan in contrast with a con-
gressional accountability scenario in America to
illustrate the divergent conversations occurring
regarding private development contractors. This
chapter pits the competing aims of accountability
to Afghan beneficiaries with accountability to US
taxpayers. The two scenarios show the compet-
ing and compatible aims of upward and down-
ward accountability. What is good for one may not
be for the other.
Chapter 2 "The Modern Development Enterprise"
briefly charts the rise of development contracting.
This chapter poses the following questions: Why
the continued reliance on private contractors?
And if so, why is it so hard to hold them account-
able through adequate monitoring and evaluation
despite many instances of reported waste, fraud
and abuse? Is it appropriate to use standard pro-
curement practices in a post-conflict reconstruc-
tion scenario?
Chapter 3 will discuss the complex integration of
security and development in the global agenda,
especially the US approach to Afghanistan. If de-
velopment is considered subservient to a national
security agenda, is it even possible to be truly ac-
countable to Afghan beneficiaries? How do the
time-sensitive desires for rapid impact projects as
counterinsurgency and stabilization strategies im-
pede accountability to beneficiaries? Is there ac-
tually a will to be downwardly accountable in the
security-development nexus?
Chapter 4 will first explain the existing account-
ability frameworks, emerging from public admin-
istration, anti-corruption and human rights dis-
courses. Within each framework, current reforms
are evaluated to see if they address the account-
ability challenges in war, and the potential impact
they can have for beneficiaries.
Chapter 5 will offer core recommendations that
point out gaps in accountability, the role of local
governance in development success, beneficiary
empowerment and striking a balance between
national interests and positive outcomes in post
conflict reconstruction.
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I. THE
ACCOUNTABILITY
MACHINE
& PRIVATE CONTRACTORS
"For accountability to work, there has to
be the power to hold to account; there has
to be the power of information and par-
ticipation; and there has to be the power
to judge and enforce judgment."
-Austen Davis,
"Concerning Accountability of Humanitarian Action"
February 2007
This chapter will analyze two con-
trasting scenes of private contractor ac-
countability from Jabal Saraj, Afghanistan
and Washington, D.C.
Scene 1 JABAL SARAJ, AFGHANISTAN
"From Subjects of Aid to Citizens of a State" 0
In January 2010, Abdul Mateen went
to visit a work site for a new school being built
in his district. As a teacher, but also as one of
the community-chosen monitors, it is his job
to monitor the construction of a local school
through bi-weekly site visits. An American
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from
Parwan province funded the school.
On this particular site visit, Mateen
and his colleagues decided to inspect the
newly-arrived construction materials and he
explained: "We at first checked the bricks
out: If you hit them together they would
break."21 Without complex tests, the moni-
tors quickly determined that the bricks, ce-
ment, doorknobs and metal sheeting would
not hold up past a few months.
When they brought this issue to the
workers asking them to stop, they were ig-
nored. After all, the monitors had no author-
ity since the workers reported to an Afghan
construction contractor, who was hired by
the American PRT. The monitors however,
had been trained by a local NGO--integrity
Watch Afghanistan (IWA)--to mobilize com-
munity and political actors for cases such as
these. The monitors quickly notified the lo-
cal police, political representatives and gath-
ered 50 local residents on the scene.
By staging a sit-in, they captured the
foreman Nabi Kohistani's attention, which
quickly got his boss at the site. The monitors
took photographs and collected video foot-
age during their biweekly visits. In addition to
showing the materials on site, they also had
concrete documentation for the Afghan con-
tractor. He had no choice but to agree that
the materials were of poor quality and sent
them back, including over 15,000 bricks. On
this day, the community won. But, this is an
aberration.
Holding contractors accountable,
whether they are Afghan, Turkish, Jordani-
an or American, is one of the defining chal-
lenges of reconstruction and development
work during conflict. Only with political pres-
sure, or rather through political accountabil-
ity mechanisms do we see those with power
demanding information and then judging the
information to hold the parties responsible
accountable. Answerability (account-giv-
ing) and Enforceability (account-holding),
are two basic components of effective ac-
countability mechanisms. Even in complex
conflicts and state-building operations, the
term 'accountable' has been largely inter-
preted ineffectively as fiscal accountability to
the donor or aid agency.
Corruption in contracting, aid or the
transitional government is considered either
a way to 'buy the peace'2 2 or is considered
an expected cost of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. Though scholars like Philippe Le Billon
Accountability Relationships
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have tried to challenge this notion by citing
the negative long-term consequences of
corruption. Other anti-corruption scholars
like Fredrik Galtung and Martin Tisne have
argued that the "upsurge of corruption and a
lack of accountability... erode trust in democ-
racy," which delegitimizes the state and in-
creases the chances of a return to violence.?
Military and civilian actors however, continue
to accept the role of corruption in the imme-
diate postwar context and as USAID-OIG,
SIGAR and CWC audits and reports have
shown, they even fund corruption.
Galtung and Tisne largely attribute
the high corruption risk due to a mismatch
between the immediate postwar develop-
ment needs, extravagant international aid
levels and the limited absorptive capacity
of the transitioning government institutions.
This mismatch is especially felt during the
"potlatch effect," where civilians have high
expectations from their interim government
and donor aid projects. The expectations
correspond with the large international foot-
print on the ground, where NGO, for-profits
and bilateral aid agencies are heavily invest-
ing in programs dealing with infrastructure
building, governance reform, rule-of-law and
gender.
Paul Collier's study of the "conflict
trap" also during the post-conflict decade,
there is generally a high influx of aid in the
beginning of the decade, which tends to ta-
per out in the middle. Though peace settle-
ments, in Afghanistan's case the 2001 Bonn
Agreement, are major opportunities for ask-
ing for aid, Collier suggests that if "long lags
between commitment and disbursement"
were normalized, aid would be far more ef-
fective? He however, cautions against the
notion that economic growth can bring down
the risk of renewed conflict during the post-
conflict decade. In the case of Afghanistan,
the state actually moved from a post-conflict
to a conflict state in the middle of the post-
conflict decade due to deteriorating security
conditions, the rise of the insurgency and the
lack of foreign aid alignment with state build-
ing in the early part of the decade.2
Since the absorptive capacity of the
interim government and civil society is just
forming and rather low, it generates two
dysfunctional trends. First, it leads to sur-
plus funds that cannot be quickly spent and
thus are absorbed by any number of actors
through corruption or merely overvalued ser-
vices and salaries. Second, since local civil
society and government may not be able to
implement projects in accordance with do-
nor expectations, there is an overreliance
on expensive foreign technical assistance
or 'bought-in capacity'.26 These "parallel
bureaucracies" that include private devel-
opment contractors working for USAID, are
perceived as expensive, corrupt and com-
peting institutions that undermine the growth
of Afghan state capacity.
Though aid agencies and donors
would argue that technical assistance is a
key intermediary that balances the popu-
lation's immediate need for services with
capacity building programs in the national
government, the fact remains that that per-
ceptions of corruption and lack of account-
ability are counterproductive to development
goals. This perception is further muddled
when the actions of contractors and sub-
contractors who implement projects on the
ground negatively reflect upon donors and
the Afghan government who are perceived
as the responsible parties to monitor aid.
An Integrity Watch Afghanistan corruption
survey from May 2008 confirms this (see
right).
Accountability as mentioned earlier
does not exist in itself. It only exists within a
series of relationships between people and
organizations. The way one defines the rela-
Galtung & Tisne-Phases and Dissonances of
Postwar Reconstruction
Reproduced from: "A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruc-
tion." Journal of Democracy.
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tionship and how each party is empowered
to hold the other accountable, determines
what type of accountability you can expect.
Let us ask: Is there a relationship
between an Afghan civilian and a private
American or Afghan contractor? The simple
answer is no. Private contractors and sub-
contractors are hired by: (1) Foreign govern-
ments, (2) aid agencies, (3) INGOs or (4)
other contractors. As a business, they cater
to the needs and objectives of their clients.
But, most of all, they prioritize their capacity
to generate profit by minimizing costs while
still delivering adequate project results for
their client. The contractor's right to profit
creates a whole host of incentives to use
cheap materials, import cheap labor, falsify
invoices, undervalue bids and resort to brib-
ery or kickbacks to gain undue advantage.
Though not all contractors are corrupt, the
massive inflow of aid money and a'spending
imperative' creates many opportunities for
corruption, especially in high corruption-risk
industries like construction. The sense of
urgency coupled with the high real and per-
ceived costs of operating in an insecure en-
vironment can also triple or quadruple proj-
ect prices. The existing corruption risks are
thus, increased due to a shortage of trained
personnel and insecure conditions to effec-
tively monitor and evaluate projects.
These were the real challenges fac-
ing IWA, an anti-corruption and pro-integrity
Afghan NGO that sought to increase trans-
parency and accountability through monitor-
ing foreign aid projects. Since there is no
existing relationship between beneficiaries
and the contractor implementing the devel-
opment project, it is very hard to demand
that contractors be accountable to the local
beneficiaries. In 2008, IWA tried to change
this by starting a pilot community-monitoring
project in Jabal Saraj to first establish a rela-
tionship between beneficiaries and contrac-
tors. Their intention was not to bypass the
donor agency funding the project, but since
donors do not have a constant presence at
project sites (especially in rural and/or inse-
cure areas), it is often more time-effective to
deal with the contractor directly than begin a
formal complaint process through the donor
compound in Kabul, the US or even the PRT
headquarters. Moreover, donors tend to treat
beneficiaries as "subjects of aid," and IWA
wanted to use community monitoring tools
and involvement of provincial councils to
transform beneficiaries into "citizens of the
state." Lodging complaints with the provin-
cial council, according to IWA, also triggers
the accountability role of local institutions to
strengthen local governance.
This is how a schoolteacher like Abdul
Mateen could establish a relationship with
the local contractor that did not previously
exist. Within this newly formed relationship,
the contractor knows that the community,
the local council and anti-corruption NGOs
are watching and expect accountability. The
absence of a direct relationship between the
contractor and the community leads to feel-
ings of marginalization, powerlessness and
increased perception of corruption. This was
evident when a school caretaker in Baghdad
Ahmad Abdu-Satar asked an Iraqi subcon-
tractor hired by American contractor Bechtel
"why they didn't finish the job?" They re-
sponded, "We don't work for you, we work
for the Americans."28
The 2005 Paris Declaration stated
that mutual accountability is necessary be-
tween donors and partner countries. Though
it was uncertain what mutual accountabil-
ity really meant (besides "shared agenda,"
"monitoring progress" and "negotiation and
dialogue") and why it only existed between
national governments, it was quickly echoed
by UN agencies and development think tanks
like UNDP 29 and ODI. 30 In April 2009, a se-
nior researcher at the Afghanistan Research
and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Mariekke Denis-
sen adapted the term to the Afghan context.
Like IWA, she too wanted to move beyond
the assumption that reporting to donors and
their constituents at home constituted mutu-
al accountability. So far, donor agencies and
donor nations have been the only ones who
could demand information from contractors
and enforce sanctions if necessary. The Af-
ghan government and civilians had either no
jurisdiction or little leverage.
Mutual accountability in Denissen's
framing could change that by providing
"mechanisms for all development actors to
claim, complain and demand answers."31
This combined with adequate public access
to information and power to monitor and
evaluate could ensure real accountability
between donors and beneficiaries. More-
over, she emphasizes that instead of fore-
going accountability in insecure situations
due to difficult conditions and push for "quick
fixes," mutual accountability should become
the main priority. Working with, through and
for the community can decrease conflict-risk
because it increases the legitimacy of devel-
opment actors.
Community monitoring of develop-
ment projects is not a complete solution to
the challenge of accountability. Monitoring
and evaluation (M&E) is a field of study,
which often requires high levels of techni-
cal expertise. Community monitoring can-
not replace formal M&E processes, but re-
quires the donors and implementers to be
responsive to community needs. Monitoring
reports, however expertly completed, can
only influence project progress at the discre-
tion of donors and implementers. Evaluation
reports are meant to inform future develop-
ment projects, but their relative importance
is determined at the discretion of the donor
agency. Prior to undertaking new evaluation
reforms, Rajiv Shah described the two-two-
two USAID evaluation model:
"Two [monitoring and evaluation] contractors
spending two weeks abroad conducting two
dozen interviews. For about $30,000, they
produce a report that no one needs and no
one reads. And the results they claim often
have little grounding in fact."33
Monitoring and evaluation can either
be a routinized, bureaucratic reporting mech-
anism with little impact, or it could be a pow-
erful political accountability tool in the hands
of IWA-trained local monitoring groups. This
is not to suggest that formal USAID moni-
toring systems are consistently unsuccess-
ful, and grassroots monitoring attempts are
always successful. Rather, monitoring and
evaluation, like any other accountability tool,
can positively or negatively affect project
beneficiaries depending on whether their
interests are properly represented. Evalua-
tion methodology that interprets beneficiary
perceptions of the project through interviews
versus one where beneficiaries interpret the
project's impacts are the products of two
different accountability relationships. In the
first, USAID officials and American citizens
are meant as the target audience. In the lat-
ter, the audience includes not only the donor
agency and population, but also the benefi-
ciaries and local government.
The National Solidarity Program
(NSP), an experiment in participatory peace
building, provides a glimpse into alternative,
viable accountability configurations. The Af-
ghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development (MRRD) designed the NSP
in 2003 in order to increase state legitimacy
among rural populations through the estab-
lishment of locally elected community de-
velopment councils (CDCs). Ashraf Ghani,
the finance minister (2002-2004) is largely
credited with the NSP's design. The CDCs
were each awarded small block grants (max
$60,000) to implement projects that reflected
the community's priorities and needs, such
as building a school, installing water pumps,
digging irrigation ditches or setting up elec-
tric stations.
One of the main themes was to shift
"from government to governance" by em-
ploying multiple levels of accountability go-
ing both ways.34 Local governance facilitates
bottom-up accountability, or the applying of
political pressure towards local and nation-
al governments. It also ensures a sense of
ownership at the local level, where the com-
munity can demand answers from both the
facilitating partner 5 hired by the Ministry to
help the community and the local construc-
tion contractors. Unlike the local monitors
trained by IWA, these CDCs are endowed
with financial and political leverage and are
even asked to contribute a portion of the
project costs to increase community buy-in.
Facilitating partners are not paid from
the CDC block grant, rather from the MRRD.
Their performance is however, evaluated
based on their responsiveness to and en-
gagement with local communities. Quan-
titative indicators for performance-based
evaluation can include number of elections
held, CDCs formed, subprojects designed,
contractors hired, and CDC satisfaction with
outcome. Though there are some concerns
regarding misuse of CDC funds by local
power brokers, or the lack of transparency
to the community regarding the facilitating
NGO's budget, the NSP has increased trust
between beneficiaries, the Afghan govern-
ment and donors.
Since perceptions play a large role
in how citizens experience corruption, the
building of trust and more transparent institu-
tions reduces the frequency and perception
of a corrupt state and overpaid development
actors. Even more significant is the notion
of timely responsiveness. Chapter 4 will dis-
cuss the importance of having accountability
mechanisms that ensure project implement-
ers are accountable to the community ben-
eficiaries in a timely fashion. Though legal
prosecution or suspension of a contractor
over fraud charges five or six years after
project implementation represents a form
of sanction and justice, it may not have any
positive impacts for the beneficiary commu-
nity that either did not receive the intended
project, or received a subpar project instead.
A recent DFID study on the causes
of radicalization of Afghan men (joining the
Taliban or Hizb-i-Islami) emphasized the
role unaccountable and/or corrupt contrac-
tors play in delegitimizing the Afghan state
apparatus in favor of competing groups like
the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami:
There is little point in providing services(whether through government, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams or NGOs) if they in-
cite more rage than appreciation due to
the poor quality work that private contrac-
tors leave behind, the bad behaviour of the
private security companies towards local
populations and the added risk of violent at-
tacks and civilian deaths that PSC presence
can mean. 6
Since half of Afghan civilians surveyed by
IWA in 2008 believe that the government is
responsible for monitoring aid, contractor
corruption can be perceived as a result of an
ineffective state. Increasing state legitimacy
and responsiveness to citizen needs and de-
mands should be the main objective of state-
building development projects. But foreign
aid agencies are ultimately accountable to
their constituents back home, reporting back
to government oversight agencies to justify
that their post war reconstruction investment
will yield returns in the form of a stable, dem-
ocratic and in most cases, an economically
liberal state. The accountability configuration
is decidedly a monetary one.
The school project in Jabal Saraj
thus, exemplifies the challenges of moni-
toring PRT- and USAID-funded projects in
Afghanistan. Most of the time, community
involvement is limited to a consultation with
local leaders to determine community priori-
ties, but implementation of any project is left
up to the contractor with hopefully, periodic
monitoring by the donor agency. Large Amer-
ican contractors have come under attack
from their own government agencies and
citizens for bloated overheads, expensive
foreign salaries and unaccountable project
outcomes. The USAID-Office of the Inspec-
tor General reported that between 2003 and
2010, based on 36 performance audits, 81%
of inadequacies in project implementation
were due to poor contractor oversight and
performance.37
Some contractors have launched se-
rious campaigns to defend their reputation,
citing low overhead costs and existing ac-
countability practices to the local community.
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), one of
the largest USAID contractors in Afghani-
stan, explained that community involvement
led to the success of its Alternatives Liveli-
hoods Program in Nangarhar province.38 A
participatory approach and communication
with the local shura, malek, mullah and mi-
rab increased project legitimacy. It also en-
sured "support from villagers" and the local
government, which facilitated work in an
insecure environment without undertaking
extreme security measures. 39 DAI also tried
to counter the blanket criticism that all con-
tractors have bloated overheads by citing
that from the AINP-Alternative Livelihoods
project budget, 80% of the funds benefited
Afghans directly, which was greater than the
mandated 70%."4 If however, the 80%-20%
distribution of aid funds through contractors
represents the norm, we would not be in the
midst of the present accountability storm in
Washington, D.C. that we will discuss in the
next scene.
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Scene 2 Congressional Hearing, Commis-
sion for Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan
April 1, 2011
Commissioner Robert Henke
So my question to you, my first ques-
tion-we have to be pretty brief, with
our time limits-can development be
done in a war zone?
USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah
Absolutely... it requires an operational
construct that differs from the tradi-
tional mission structure, which is why
we've devolved authority to our people
and PRTs in Afghanistan and built proj-
ect mechanisms that can move much
more quickly, and improved oversight
at that distal point of service and pro-
grammatic implementation.
Commissioner Shays
Isn't it true that your agency has been
involved in some poor planning and
oversight of government projects and
that some of your contractors have
performed badly?
USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah
And we've been aggressive about rein-
ing that in and improving oversight...
in just 14 months, we've restructured
how we do award mechanisms. We've
rebuilt a partner-vetting system in Af-
ghanistan. We've implemented finan-
cial controls around subcontracts and
in new contracts are shrinking the num-
ber of tiering layers so we have more
visibility. We've improved project over-
sight by tripling the number of contract
officers and building a program-sup-
port unit in our Office of Acquisition As-
sistance here in Washington, D.C.
"Poor planning and oversight" is
popular phrase these days with any number
of US government oversight agencies look-
ing into reconstruction and development ef-
forts in Afghanistan. The exchange between
USAID administrator and members of the
Commission for Wartime Contracting (CWC)
is a decidedly different type of accountability
scenario than the one found in Jabal Saraj.
Unlike the local monitor Abdul Mateen, the
CWC has the legal authority to demand an-
swers. USAID, along with the Department
of State, Department of Defense, local con-
tractors and various Inspector Generals, is
answerable to this commission. The com-
mission is asking questions about contrac-
tor accountability that are similar to the ones
being asked on the ground in Afghanistan,
albeit the operational scale is broader. More
importantly, they want to ensure that con-
tractors are financially and otherwise held
accountable to the interests of the Ameri-
can people. This is evident in how the CWC
came to be.
On January 2, 2008, Staff Sgt. Ryan
Maseth was electrocuted in the shower on
an Iraqi base due to faulty wiring through a
water pump that was not properly grounded.
This facility like most US army bases was
built by the largest Department of Defense
contractor Kellogg, Brown and Root-a for-
mer subsidiary of Halliburton. Though this
was one of countless examples of poor con-
tractor performance, it gained widespread
attention because KBR had prior knowl-
edge of faulty wiring that resulted in the sol-
dier's death. Twenty-six days after Maseth's
death, the US accountability machine was
invigorated and the 110th Congress swiftly
passed a law establishing the Commission
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. In 2008, both private security and pri-
vate development contractors were finally
under scrutiny by US lawmakers, uniformly
Image Source: Commission for Wartime Contracting Webpage
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/hearings/commission/188-hearing2Ol1-04-01
Commission for Wartime Contracting
I April 201 1, Hearing
28
calling for greater contractor accountability.
The CWC has since carefully investigated
contractor fraud, waste and abuse and re-
vealed how existing accountability mecha-
nisms built into DoS, DoD and USAID have
failed to prevent egregious forms of con-
tractor corruption and inefficiency. Their
mandate however, is to hold these agencies
and their contractors accountable to the
American public, the taxpayers who have
been funding the security and development
enterprise.
The CWC is only one of many over-
sight agencies dealing with contractors
in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a whole
cadre of Inspector Generals (IGs) conduct-
ing audits and inspections of projects, e.g.
USAID-OIG, SIGAR (est. 2008), SIGIR (est.
2004), DoD-OIG, DoS-OIG and DCAA. It is
partly due to these institutionalized over-
sight bodies that the high levels of fraud,
waste and abuse have been revealed to
the American public. In their 2009 interim
report, the CWC found that these agencies
had published 537 reports and issued thou-
sands of recommendations on improving
project implementation and increasing con-
tractor accountability.41
These reports have however, inadver-
tently built a case for budget cuts for more
fiscally vulnerable agencies like USAID in-
stead of facilitating a mature dialogue on
how to shift the accountability paradigm in
the modern development enterprise. Instead
of concluding that post war reconstruction
and development project outcomes can be
improved by increasing accountability to in-
dividual civilian and government beneficia-
ries who have both greater stake and ability
to monitor these projects, the regressive no-
tion that 'investment' in development should
have measurable 'returns' for the American
taxpayer persists.
Moreover, the problems with USAID's
general operations were identified as early
as 2002 in a GAO report entitled "USAID
Relies Heavily on Nongovernmental Organi-
zations, but Better Data Needed to Evalua-
tion Approaches." 2 This GAO report cited
how USAID's procurement database was
"plagued by data-entry flaws" that made it
hard to keep track of USAID's various fund-
ing mechanisms and financial data on firms
that receive funds.43
In addition to this general critique
of structural problems in USAID's ability
to keep track of funds and organizations it
funded, the first USAID-OIG memorandum
in April 2003 identified the major risks for
fraud among USAID contractors and sub-
contractors in reconstructing Afghanistan."
The memo included an important risk as-
sessment conducted between October 30
to November 9, 2002 of the 3-year $300
million Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities
and Services (REFS) Program to be imple-
mented by a large US engineering contractor
Louis Berger Group. Since this risk assess-
ment sums most of the major challenges
and corruption risks faced by conducting
large-scale reconstruction and development
projects in conflict, it is worthwhile to exam-
ine the document (see right):45
George R. Jiron did his due diligence
as the USAID acting inspector general by
outlining the 5 major risks of conducting
development work in Afghanistan using
contractors (see right). Jiron's memo defini-
tively proves that USAID/Afghanistan was
made aware of all the major risks of em-
ploying subcontractors at least as early as
November 2002. But instead of taking heed
to this early risk assessment, the USAID/
Afghanistan mission director Craig G. Buck
responded by undermining the risk assess-
ment and downplaying the actual risks:
We do caution that the risk assessment
which was based upon only nine person-
days of presence within Afghanistan itself,
L Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS) Progame
Purpose
Design, implement, and
complete rehabilitation of
infrastructure such as
roads, electric energy
networks, schools and
health facilities.
Risk Exposre
High
Pkmmned Auedit C'overage
Agency-contracted concurrent financial audits of LBG local costs.
Subcontractor compliance and/or performance may be subjected to financial or
performance audits. However, subcontractor costs will likely not be audited
because subcontracts are to be firm fixed priced (see discussion below under
"Implemnenting Arrangements").
Implementing Entities-The LBG, a U.S. engineering firm, will be the prime
contractor. Although it is a well-known firm, the LBG has limited experience
in Afghanistan. Subcontractors will also probably have limited experience and
the Mission is concerned about their capacity to carry out their work.
Therefore, the risk is considered high.
Amount of Funding-This is a 3-year $143 million contract plus an option
year for an additional $71 million. The risk is high both because the funding is
significant and because the contractor is under intense pressure to perform in a
short period of time in the face of ongoing political instability, limited
availability of construction equipment, and the challenge of finding
subcontractors able to do the work,
In The LBG was awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee
contract. This type of contract is susceptible to significant cost overruns if not
carefully managed and monitored. Subcontractors will be awarded firm fixed-
priced contracts. Such contracts do not have the risks inherent in cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts.
However, there are risks associated with the LBG selecting and employing
subcontractors. For exanple, how transparent and competitive will the process
The REFS is a 3-year S300 million program. The contract with the Louis Berger Group is the
first award under the REFS program
Louis Berger Group (LBG) is
the prime contractor for the
REFS program.
1. Using American contractors may not be appropriate for Afghanistan
a. American development contractors, such as the Louis Berger
Group, have limited experience in Afghanistan and may not have
adequate "capacity to carry out their work."
2. Costs-Plus-Fixed-Fee contracts tend to result in cost overruns
a. Louis Berger Group was awarded a costs-plus-fixed-fee contract,
which is "susceptible to significant cost overruns if not carefully man
aged and monitored."
3. Subcontractors' implementation capacity
a. OIG was concerned about how transparent and competitive the
subcontracting process will be.
b. Afghan construction firms, whose numbers have significantly
diminished due to 22 years of fighting, may not be reliable, too new
to the business or simply not have the capacity to properly imple
ment projects.
c. Subcontractors may charge unreasonable costs. LBG is thus
"required to develop information on unit costs on both a national and
regional basis."
d. Delays in USAID disbursements could result in LBG having to
pay subcontractor advances out of pocket. If so, "controls must
be in place to ensure that funds are not advanced in excess of sub
contractor needs."
4. Afghanistan is a cash economy
a. Cash disbursements provide many opportunities for corruption.
5. Security Issues
a. Road projects are especially susceptible to banditry and are in
the middle of military operations, making them targets for insurgent
attacks.
are inherently vulnerable to such things as fraud, theft of assets and
construction materials, and/or nonperformance or poor performance.
The construction activities planned for Afghanistan face additional risks. For
example, security for the road project is a major consideration because the
highway traverses mine fields, areas of ongoing military operations, and
banditry. (However, it should be noted that the U.S. government plans to
secure an agreement with the Afghan government to provide adequate security
for engineering and construction crews) Also, weather is always an intangible
when it cornes to construction. Rehabilitation of the first 39 kilometers of
highway was beginning just before the onset of winter. During winter,
construction will switch to the lowlands in the south. The result may be a
patchwork of disjointed improved segments of highway-especially as two
other sovereign countries are participating in the project
The participation of other organizations and these two other countries in the
highway project poses additional risks-such as construction delays. For
example, each segment of highway must be certified as mine-free before
reconstruction work can be begun. Mission officials noted that they must
negotiate with the United Nations (UN) de-mining organization to clean up the
areas in which reconstruction is to be done, and that they do not have control
over bow quickly the UN organization will respond. In addition. Japan and
Saudi Arabia are participating in the reconstruction of the east-west highway.
Japan may not begin work until 2004, and the nature of Saudi Arabia's
contribution is still uncertain. Specifically, it is unclear whether Saudi Arabia
will contribute money to the LBG contract or fund its own construction work
using a Saudi contractor. In other words, there is a question as to when all the
"firancial pipelines will be active."
In summary, the risk is high for "nature of activities financed" based on the
concerns discussed above.
be? What will be the experience and capacity of the subcontractors? What
types of arrangements will be made between the LBG and the subcontractors
to ensure that work is done on schedule and in accordance with contract
requirements. Because of 22 years of fighting, the number of private sector
construction companies has greatly declined-and most construction
equipment has been destroyed or is inoperable; the risk therefore is high that
subcontractors may not be reliable, may be entirely new to Afghanistan, and/or
that required heavy equipment may not be readily available.
Another major risk is that subcontractor procurement irregularities could
occur. The LBG is required to submit a procurement plan to USAID for its
approval. USAID will need to ensure that this plan is followed and procedures
for full and open competition are being met. The contract also contains
numerous other requirements to help insure that subcontractor costs are
reasonable (e.g., the LBG is required to develop information on unit costs on
both a national and regional basis). Audit would ensure that such requirements
are carried out.
While costs incurred by the subcontractors will likely not be audited (because
the subs will have firm fixed-price contracts), one audit concern is that
advances could be in excess of subcontractor needs. However, LBG is
anticipating that advances will not be necessary because of an expedited
payment system for subcontractor invoices.
The system works like this. LBG/Kabul issues invoices for both United States
and local costs to USAID/Philippines, the paying station under the contract.
USAID/Manila would then be required to pay LBG in the United States.
within 14 days. LBG/Kabul would then pay subcontractors 7 days thereafter,
for a total 21-day turnaround. The Prompt Payment Act permits a 14-day
turnaround in payment for construction progress payments (as opposed to the
usual 30 day payment cycle). However, if this system does not work as
anticipated, LBG might find itself forced to pay advances after all. If advances
are paid, controls must be in place to ensure that funds are not advanced in
excess of subcontractor needs.
And a final major risk: Afghanistan has a total cash economy. The banking
sector is undeveloped, and LBG anticipates that most transactions in-country
will have to be made in cash.
In summary, risk exposure is considered high for the reasons detailed above.
Nature of Activities Financed-Planned construction includes rehabilitating
the 600-mile east-west highway (in conjunction with Japan and Saudi Arabia),
schools, health facilities, and government buildings. Construction activities
which covered in detail only two of the Mis-
sion's projects/activities, and which did not
look at the adequacy of specific internal con-
trols or whether transactions were properly
documented, could be unfairly perceived or
even cited as a criticism of current USAID
Mission efforts. We would not like to see it
used out of context to create reservations
about development efforts in Kabul even be-
fore these fledgling efforts have had the op-
portunity to leave the nest [my emphasis].46
Though Buck's defensive attitude towards a
risk assessment that could be "perceived or
even cited as a criticism" could be under-
stood given the early state of USAID opera-
tions in Afghanistan, they do not excuse the
fact that these initial "risks" materialized into
actual instances of corruption, fraud and
abuse from 2003 onwards.
Each successive USAID-OIG audit,
SIGAR audit or CWC report has hammered
on the same themes mentioned in Jiron's
risk assessment. Conducting audits, inves-
tigations and issuing more reports between
2003 and 2011 has not frankly, revealed any
new information about development con-
tractors and how USAID manages them.
In 2010 however, Jiron's risks materialized
into a $69.3 million settlement and a crimi-
nal conviction of the Louis Berger Group
for overbilling USAID for reconstruction
work in Afghanistan and Iraq. 47 Harold Sa-
lomon - a former senior financial analyst at
the company - was the whistleblower who
disclosed these fraudulent activities to the
government in late 2005, three years after
Jiron's memo. It seemed that just as proj-
ect costs incurred in Afghanistan could not
be monitored, the manipulative behavior of
upper level management in the New Jersey
office also went unmonitored. It took five-
years for Salomon's information to turn into
a conviction. Neither his information, nor the
conviction has prevented Louis Berger from
continuing old contracts or even winning
new ones. Reconstruction and development
contractors like Louis Berger have become
modern day carpetbaggers - post war re-
construction profiteers working under the
benevolent USAID motto "From the Ameri-
can People."
Referring back to Galtung and Tisne's
diagram of the Potlatch effect, it is clearly
apparent in the Accountability Timeline
that for the first few years of the Afghan
reconstruction effort, there were no actual
audits conducted by USAID-OIG until 2004.
Despite a consistent release of audit reports
by USAID-OIG after 2004, it was not until the
establishment of CWC and SIGAR in 2008
that political scrutiny into development con-
tractors began. And, it was only seven years
after the Bonn Agreement in 2009 that the
CWC and SIGAR began to conduct serious
investigations, hearings and publish reports
on the matter. Galtung and Tisne would
argue that it is in the immediate post war
context that scrutiny is needed to prevent
large-scale corruption and the ineffective
distribution of aid. But it is because of the
perception of development practitioners like
Craig Buck who believe that the panicked
imperative of rapidly implementing projects
takes precedence over potentially hindering
oversight and audit mechanisms, that the
accountability debate is postponed indefi-
nitely.
The business or enterprise formula-
tion of development is detrimental to con-
ducting real development. In fact, embrac-
ing a private-sector model and continuously
shrinking USAID capacity through person-
nel and operating budget cuts, have led to
the overreliance on contractors in the first
place. The CWC's second interim report to
Congress entitled At What Risk? Correct-
ing Over-reliance on Contractors in Con-
tingency Operations came to the following
conclusions: (1) Contractors have become
the default option, (2) Agencies do not treat
contingency contracting as a core function
and (3) Enforcement policies and controls
fail to ensure contractor accountability.48
The findings based on CWC's study of war-
time contracting can have no impact on the
past decade of poor contracting practices
in Afghanistan, but do have the potential to
reinsert an accountability framework that
bypasses business accounting to refocus
on the plight of end beneficiaries. So far,
that has not been the case.
This depletion of USAID capacity
over decades has virtually eliminated most
in-house capacity to perform basic func-
tions, like monitoring and evaluation, which
is also contracted out in conflict scenarios.
And then we get to the conflict. The impact
of civil-military integration, or the politiciza-
tion of aid and development to achieve se-
curity objectives, has not been adequately
challenged by the American accountability
machine. To reiterate Commissioner Hen-
ke's query-can development be done in
a warzone? Maybe, but so far it has come
at the high price of poorly monitored, rapid-
impact projects to win hearts and minds, re-
liance on private security contractors hired
by private development contractors and ul-
timately, the marginalization of beneficiaries
because sustained community engagement
is easily hindered by security threats.
The American accountability machine
on the one hand, is concerned about fiscal
accountability of civilian contractors and on
the other hand, the uncomfortable yet ram-
pant outsourcing of 'inherently governmen-
tal functions' like security to private military
and security contractors. On September
16, 2007 Blackwater military contractors
shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Al-Nisour
Square while protecting a US State Depart-
ment convoy on its way to meet USAID rep-
resentatives. This prompted outrage from
authorities in Iraq, Washington D.C. and the
Pentagon. For the first time since the start of
the Iraq war, lawmakers became fully aware
about the relative legal impunity of private
military and security contractors.49
Three weeks after the incident, a bill
to expand American legal jurisdiction over
all US contractors was quickly passed by
the House of Representatives with support-
ers stating:
The truth is, every time we see an incident
with an Iraqi civilian being killed, and Ameri-
can contractors escaping accountability, our
men and women in uniform suffer, they see
insurgent support rise, and lose the trust of
the Iraqi people.50
Despite being introduced in the Senate by
then Illinois Senator Obama, the bill was
never voted upon and remains in limbo. This
was a failed attempt to establish legal ac-
countability of private security contractors.
In this framing, contractors should be held
accountable to American law so their ac-
tions do not undermine the war effort. Iraqi
or Afghan law and authorities could not ex-
ercise jurisdiction over contractors at this
time and thus, the fate awaiting those em-
ployees was simply termination, not pros-
ecution. Blackwater however, did suffer a
temporary setback when its license was re-
voked in Iraq only to later rebrand itself as
Xe Services LLC and acquire new contracts.
This notorious incident sparked a
massive debate among US scholars and in
the popular media questioning (1) whether
PMSCs should perform 'inherently govern-
mental functions' like providing security
to Americans and Iraqis during a war, (2)
whether we should be so heavily depen-
dent on contractors who are in the field in
greater numbers than US military personnel
and (3) since we are so dependent on them,
how can we better hold them accountable
through legal and bureaucratic mecha-
nisms?
Human rights advocates also em-
barked on several legal accountability proj-
ects such as the Swiss-initiated Montreux
Document (2008) and the UN Draft Interna-
tional Convention on PMSCs (2010). PM-
SCs and their industry associations like In-
ternational Peace Operations Association
(IPOA) and the British Association of Private
Security Companies (BAPSC) responded
by issuing new voluntary Codes of Conduct
to demonstrate acceptance of their human
rights and criminal obligations under inter-
national and national law. 51 Every country,
especially those with heavy presence of PM-
SCs like Iraq and Afghanistan, were urged to
strengthen domestic legislation to license,
regulate and prosecute private contractors
when necessary. The global accountability
machinery prior to and especially after the
Al-Nisoor square massacre has heavily in-
vested in creating new laws to control the
behavior of PMSCs-to end the culture of
impunity.
However, if we refer back to the state-
ment that "sovereignty lies with the citizen,
and authority must be held to account," is
it truly feasible to ensure total accountabil-
ity when the "authority" contracts out its
inherently governmental functions due to a
lack of governmental capacity to perform
those functions in the first place. Through
decades of downsizing, the US government
has come to rely on the internal professional
accountability mechanisms of private con-
tractors in lieu of adequate levels of govern-
ment personnel and resources to monitor
and evaluate contractor performance. The
efficacy of legal mechanisms is thus, rela-
tive to the capacity to enforce those mecha-
nisms.
More importantly, these account-
ability mechanisms have not established
a direct relationship between the rights of
the Afghan or Iraqi citizen and the PMSCs
that operate in their countries. In a conflict
context, the weakened or nonexistent state
must play intermediary for a citizen seeking
remedy for human rights violations, damage
done to their property or even death. De-
spite high levels of global and national out-
rage, a handful of lawsuits filed under the
Alien Torts Claims Act12 53 and MEJA, impas-
sioned calls for accountability and the cre-
ation of a few laws and codes of conduct,
there is little evidence that a PMSC is much
more accountable today to the states in
which it operates, or that an al-Nisoor type
incident is any more preventable than it was
in 2007.
It is apparent that when account-
ability of contractors is discussed in con-
gressional hearings, audit reports or in the
domestic media, the emphasis is primarily
on (1) Fiscal/Monetary accountability to the
US taxpayer for wartime contractors and (2)
Creating an appropriate legal accountability
framework to control the behavior of PM-
SCs. In the countless USAID-OIG, SIGAR,
GAO and CWC reports from 2003 onwards,
there is rarely if any mention of account-
ability to Afghan civilians. The sacrifices of
the wronged American taxpayer and brave
American soldier are dually invoked to call
for greater contractor accountability. Though
at first it is easy to mistake this patriotic, po-
litical shorthand as merely a tactic to get the
issue on the table, it is disappointing to find
that the US modern development enterprise
has no desire to be accountable to the end
beneficiaries of their projects, such as the
school teacher and local monitor Abdul Ma-
teen.
Though Rajiv Shah claims that his
''agency is no longer satisfied by writing big
checks to big contractors and calling it de-
velopment," that is in fact what the Ameri-
can development enterprise encourages
because accountability to beneficiaries is
simply not on the accountability agenda; it
is not even a topic for debate.
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2. THE
MODERN
DEVELOPMENT
ENTERPRISE
"I think it's fair to say that USAID, our
premier aid agency, has been decimated.
You know it has half the staff it used to
have. It's turned into more of a contract-
ing agency than an operational agency
with the ability to deliver."
-Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Commitee
13 January 2009
In 2010, USAID paid Development
Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) over $486 million
dollars for implementing development proj-
ects, many of them in Afghanistan. Another
chunk of $418 million was paid out to The
Louis Berger Group, Inc. (LBG). This was
accompanied by $458 million to Chemon-
ics International, Inc. and $192 million to
the Research Triangle Institute (RTI).54 This
is a very long list of for-profit development
firms. In conflict and natural disaster con-
texts, most of the development projects that
are funded by US aid agencies and some
by UN agencies are actually implemented
through contracts, cooperative agreements
or grants with private development contrac-
tors or non-profits.
This trend in privatizing develop-
ment project implementation is not a new
phenomenon. In fact, private development
firms like DAI have succeeded mostly due
to a symbiotic relationship with USAID since
the 1970s. Former students of the Harvard
Kennedy School for Government started
DAI after their tenures with USAID and the
Peace Corps, because they collectively be-
lieved that a profit-driven firm competing on
the basis of technical excellence could pro-
vide the best economic development advice
to developing countries. Giving DAI its first
break in the 1970s, USAID has continued to
rely on the company to be one of its largest
project-implementing partners in the past
40 years.55
As Dr. Allison Stanger reminds us in a
Center for a New American Security report
entitled Contracting in Conflicts: The Path
to Reform that "the federal government had
the same number of full-time employees in
2008 as it had in 1963."56 In those 45 years
however, the federal budget has tripled in
real terms and the gap has been made up in
part by contractors. Christopher McKenna
has carefully documented the rise of consul-
tants in the federal government and private
sector since the 1860s, which according to
him has resulted in "creating the contractor
state." 57
The contractor state at war means
over 250,000 DoD contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In simpler terms, it means a 1:1
ratio of contractors to troops in Iraq and a
significantly higher 1.42:1 ratio in Afghani-
stan.58 The use of contractors has allowed
the Bush and now Obama administration
to more than double the combat and sup-
port personnel in the two theatres of war.
The contractor state doing reconstruction
means pouring $53.31 billion into Iraq since
2003.59 Of that figure, USAID spent $7.6 bil-
lion in Iraq just between fiscal years 2007
and 2010. If that figure seems large, then
contemplate the $55 billion that has been
poured into the Afghanistan reconstruction
effort since 2001. Just between 2007 and
2009 USAID, DoD and DoS reported allo-
cating $17.7 billion in contracts, cooperative
agreements and grants to over 7,000 con-
tractors in Afghanistan.60
Private Development Contractors
Year Founded & USAID Contracts in 2010
Year Company USAID Contracts
Founded in 2010
($US Millions)
1963 Louis Berger Group Inc. (Morristown, N.J.) 143.8
2006 Louis Berger Group Inc. and Black & Veatch 594.4(BV Special Projects Corp. Joint Venture
est.1915)
195 Re h Triangle Institute (Research 228.0+87
Triangle Part, N.C.)
1965 Abt Associates (Cambridge, MA) 123.6
1970 Development Alternatives Inc. (Bethanda, MO) 32.75 + i05.8 +
66.1
1975 Chemonics (Washington, D.C.) 526.8
1977 Creatie Associates International Inc. 1,630.0
1977 Tetra Tech ARD 126.8
1998 Interational Relief and Development Inc. 89.4
1997 BearingPoint 72.5
The contractor state also gives rise
to salient questions such as whether the
use of contractors for "inherently govern-
ment functions" is a violation of federal law,
or whether the CIA's employment of 10,000
contractors (a third of their workforce) is an
internal national security threat. CIA Direc-
tor Leon Panetta stated that "for too long,
we've depended on contractors to do the
operational work that ought to be done [by
CIA employees]." 6 Defense secretary Rob-
ert M. Gates wants to scale the number de-
fense contractors back to pre 9/11 levels,
but he recently confessed, "I can't get a
number on how many contractors work for
the Office of the Secretary of Defense."6 2
The Department of Defense and the
CIA's struggle with first counting, then hold-
ing their contractors accountable is some-
thing USAID can certainly empathize with.
The reliance of western governments on
private contractors has historically skyrock-
eted during times of either internal insecu-
rity or foreign military and humanitarian in-
tervention. For example, around 600 small
companies were formed after 9/11 to pro-
vide intelligence services to US agencies
due to "the huge flow of taxpayer money
into the private sector."63 Before the war in
Iraq, the British PMSC industry was esti-
mated to be $320 million. By March 2004,
this number quintupled to $1.6 billion.64
Similarly, the private development industry
thrives on government funded post-conflict
reconstruction and development projects.
The reconstruction efforts in Bosnia
and Herzegovina during the mid-1990s is
one such example that created many op-
portunities for private development firms
such as DAI. Here is an excerpt from DAI's
history book that demonstrates how closely
firms rely on post-conflict reconstruction
contracts:
Six months after the December 1995 Day-
ton Accords ended three years of war in this
former Yugoslav republic, [Jean] Gilson was
on a military C-130 on her way to launch
the Bosnia Reconstruction Finance Facil-
ity. This two-year contract was big in every
way--DAI's largest project up to that time in
terms of revenue. In June 1996, eight bank-
ers working for DAI arrived in Sarajevo with
more than $300 million worth of credit at
their disposal. Their objective was to instill
a 'credit culture' in a society that had no his-
tory of commercial bank lending and, above
all, to create jobs and, thereby, foster stabil-
ity.65
Balkan veterans from the 1990s can
probably draw parallels to Afghanistan and
Iraq where development objectives like job
creation and finance reform are tied to se-
curity and stability. They could also note
how as in Bosnia, today in Afghanistan and
Iraq many established prime contractors
and fledgling subcontractors have won their
"largest project up to that time in terms of
revenue" leading to the rapid expansion of
the private development industry. Chemon-
ics International is one such firm who won
$250 million in USAID contracts in 2008,
up from only $6.7 million before the wars in
2000."
One big difference between the Bos-
nian reconstruction efforts and today's de-
velopment enterprise is that USAID had
close to 3,500 people in 1990 in charge
of $5 billion in aid. Today, the agency has
2,200 people administering $8 billion every
year. The shift in these numbers over the
past two decades has dire developmental
consequences on the ground. For instance,
Chemonics International cited above re-
ceived a $153 million contract in 2003 to
train farmers, build irrigation canals, grain si-
los, greenhouses and vaccinate livestock to
promote agriculture in Afghanistan. Through
various investigations by USAID-OIG, the
GAO and non-profit group CorpWatch, it
was revealed that several grain silos col-
lapsed during the first winter, there were
construction defects in their buildings and
farmers were not trained as promised. The
OIG declared that none of the eight project
objectives the company was hired for were
fulfilled.67
In addition to contracting project
implementation, USAID also contracts out
the monitoring and evaluation of these proj-
ects. That means USAID uses contractors
to monitor other contractors. International
Business and Technical Consultants, Inc.
(IBTCI) is one of the contractors frequently
hired to conduct monitoring in Iraq. In March
of 2008, the USAID-Office of Foreign Disas-
ter Asssistance (OFDA) hired IBTCI to moni-
tor their activities in Iraq. Upon completing
their assessment and providing a list of rec-
ommendations to improve the program in
May of 2008, they had to wait until June of
2009 to receive any response or follow up
from OFDA.
This example reveals an obvious con-
cern about how and whether the monitoring
and evaluation of USAID projects actually
influences their implementation in a timely
fashion. A more glaring question however,
is how can the agency truly be invested in
and know about the positive or negative de-
velopment outcomes their projects have on
the target beneficiaries in conflict settings if
they contract out both the implementation
and the monitoring?
The youngest and most reform-
minded administrator USAID has seen in a
while-Rajiv Shah-has ushered in a series
of reforms called USAID Forward to shift
away from the contracting, procurement and
evaluation policies under the previous ad-
ministrations of Henrietta Fore (2007-2009),
Randall L. Tobias (2006-2007) and Andrew
S. Natsios (2001-2005). Natsios, the USAID
administrator during the beginning of the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, publicly came
out in 2006 to criticize Paul Bremer for "al-
lowing ill-qualified or corrupt contractors to
dominate" the reconstruction effort in Iraq
without setting up adequate monitoring sys-
tems.8
In the fall of 2009, Natsios who had
critcized Bremer's performance published
"The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and
Development" inspired by the Nine Prin-
ciples of War found in modern Army field
manuals. He cites Accountability as the
9th principle, as he celebrates USAID's
business model in Afghanistan. Using the
Kabul-to-Kandahar road project, he claims
that USAID was able to ensure contractor
accountability through (1) strong internal
procurement and implementation proce-
dures that are monitored by the agency's
Inspector General, (2) demanding prime in-
ternational contractors subcontract to local
Afghani companies, (3) contracting the US
Army Corps of Engineers to provide techni-
cal oversight and (4) urging the Ministry of
Finance to implement anti-corruption pro-
grams. He also cites how USAID "compiles
a list of corrupt organizations and bars them
from receiving future funding."69
Natsios' 2009 rosy depiction of ac-
countable contracting practices within US-
AID is in contradistinction to current USAID
administrator Shah's assessment of the
agency's contracting practices in 2011 and
the findings of the CWC through various tes-
timonies of contractors, inspector generals
and oversight officials. In fact, every single
accountability mechanism cited by Natsios
has been revealed to be thoroughly lack-
ing. The numbers of suspensions and dis-
barments of fraudulent contractors prior to
Shah's administration were negligible. But,
Natsios' article demonstrates how easy it is
to claim accountability by citing existing bu-
reaucratic and legal accountability mecha-
nisms built into an agency.
The former OXFAM head of policy in
Afghanistan Matt Waldman bemoaned how
the "vast amount of aid is absorbed in the
profits of private contractors and consul-
tants," namely the five biggest US contrac-
tors who take half of the US development
assistance in the country.70 Despite Wald-
man's pointed criticism, he still concludes,
"international contractors are indispens-
able" though require more scrutiny.71
Even contracting's fiercest critics
resolve that somehow greater account-
ability would fix the problems caused by
the overreliance of development agencies
on contractors. The question we return to
again and again is how to actually realize
accountability for contractors when the tra-
ditional reporting mechanisms, electronic
databases, transparency legislation, crimi-
nal investigations, contractual clauses and
sporadic media scandals have so far proven
insufficient checks on reconstruction efforts
during a conflict.
A USDA agriculture advisor to Af-
ghanistan between 2004 and 2005 de-
scribed the USAID contracting process as
follows:
They [USAID] spent-and they brag on it-$1.2
billion in '04 in assistance money in Afghani-
stan. USAID does not have the people and
didn't hire up to meet the needs. They hired
two main contractors: IOM and Chemonics.
There's your second layer. These two orga-
nizations then hire contractors to do proj-
ects and these contractors hire people to
do projects. Those people hire people to do
projects. You can have five layers of people
for organizations, businesses, before you
ever get to the person who puts it on the
ground.72
If private military and security contractors
have been primarily targeted for human
rights violations and arms trafficking, then
private development contractors have been
primarily targeted for reckless spending and
lack of financial accountability to US tax-
payers and Afghan civilians who frequently
receive incomplete or inadequate work from
subcontractors.
In the first several years of con-
tracting practice in Afghanistan and Iraq, a
popular form of contracting was costs-plus
contracts. These contracts pay a base, ne-
gotiated amount to contractors for services
rendered plus any additional costs incurred
during implementation. In a conflict context,
it makes sense to allow for flexibility due to
unexpected costs. In practice however, this
allowed for rampant abuse and overspend-
ing. Moreover, even when contractors failed
to provide services or constructed buildings
that collapsed, repairs and improvements
would still be billed to the contracting agen-
cy and would not be paid out of the contrac-
tor's pocket.3
Despite the existence of several dis-
ciplinary measures to hold contractors ac-
countable, such as withholding payments,
imposing fines or firing a contractor, a senior
engineer in the US Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) explained that using disciplinary
measures does not necessarily produce de-
sired outcomes.74 For example, he explained
that if he threatened to withhold payment or
impose a fine, the contractor would with-
hold payment to construction workers, who
are employed by the contractor and not US-
ACE thus, contributing to labor exploitation.
Also, firing contractors could only be done at
a very early stage due to funding structures.
If a contractor was fired in the middle of a
project, all the funds paid to the contractor
would be lost and the new contractor would
have to be hired through remaining project
funds because they could not ask for more
funds.
He also explained the challenges of
dealing with "broker firms" or contracting
companies that form overnight from Jordan,
Turkey or Pakistan. These firms have exper-
tise in drafting attractive bids and procuring
contracts, but after winning a contract they
either disappear if the contract is front-load-
ed (a large percentage of the contract is paid
to the firm upfront) or extract the majority of
the funds for their overhead expenses leav-
ing barely enough to cover labor and project
costs. Needless to say, it takes an extremely
creative and astute contract supervisor to
see through the potential scams and waste
in each minute step of project implementa-
tion.
Accountability thus, requires the ef-
fective building of relationships at every
level of a reconstruction effort: Between
an Afghan civilian and the Afghan govern-
ment, between the civilian and contractor,
between the contractor and aid agency/
client, between the aid agency and govern-
ment oversight agency, and finally between
the oversight agency and the American tax-
payer. Some of these relationships are man-
dated under law (between aid agencies and
government oversight agency), whereas
others, such as the one between a private
contractor and an Afghan civilian and by ex-
tension the Afghan government, have yet to
be established.
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3. SECURITY-
DEVELOPMENT
NEXUS
"The responsibility to protect opens
up the way to a responsibility to
reconstruct."s5
Mark Duffield
Development, Security & Unending War
On January 25, 2011 a historic merg-
er occurred. It was not on the footsteps
of Wall Street, rather across the river from
Washington, D.C. in the silent, scenic setting
of Virginia. DynCorp International, a Private
Military Contractor (PMC) founded in 1946
purchased Casals & Associates, an interna-
tional development firm committed to de-
mocracy, rule of law, conflict management
and anti-corruption work.76 This merger is
emblematic of a well-established linkage, or
circular conditionality between security and
development in setting both policy agendas
and corporate strategy.
Under colonialism, colonial regimes
designed "welfare schemes for the protest-
ing natives"77 to ensure continued access
to colonized lands; During the cold war,
development was used to offer "incentives
for restive rural peasant populations not to
rebel." 78 During the cold war, the specter
of communism justified American develop-
ment investment in selected countries to ei-
ther bolster strong, anti-communist regimes
or prevent at-risk countries from falling to
communism. Development, on the one
hand, is claimed as a precondition to secu-
rity and on the other hand, it is difficult to
pursue development in the absence of se-
curity. Within this self-contained rationale,
there emerges great potential for financial
gains by both private security and develop-
ment contractors. The merging of a private
development firm with a private military firm
is simply a reconfiguration of the relation-
ship between the security and development
industries into a corporate form.
Scholars so far have warned that
this newest manifestation of the security-
development nexus pushes forth a global
interventionist agenda. The Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) doctrine is an exemplar of
the ideological shift from state sovereignty
to contingent sovereignty.79 The R2P as en-
shrined in the 2005 UN World Summit ele-
vated the international community's obliga-
tion to intervene to prevent severe human
rights violations, including ethnic cleansing
and genocide. UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon recently reasserted the importance
of implementing the R2P when the sover-
eign state fails in its "responsibility to ensure
protection of human beings from want, from
war, and from repression."80
The International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect includes such
high profile human rights organizations like
Human Rights Watch, International Crisis
Group and the United Nations Association
of Sweden. 81 Human rights advocates and
even the UN Secretary General have grown
tired of the slow, bureaucratic UN machinery
that often prevents swift action or provides
inadequate resources to for example, pre-
vent genocide in Darfur. Ban Ki-Moon ex-
pressed his frustration with member states
on 2 February 2011:
As we repeatedly pointed out in Sudan, if
we do not have helicopters, we are only able
to field a static force. Securing the required
resources and troops has consumed much
of my energy. That experience underscores
what can happen when Member States fail
to provide the resources necessary to carry
out the Council's mandates.82
A month after his statement, in March 2011,
R2P was invoked by the international com-
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munity as a rights-based rationale to inter-
vene in Libya.
The "responsibility to protect" how-
ever, more often than not "opens the way
to a responsibility to reconstruct."83 The
living laboratories of Iraq and Afghanistan
have revealed the challenges of realizing
the security goals of the military occupation
through development assistance. Especial-
ly, when foreign and national development
agencies, private development firms and
NGOs struggle with project implementation
in an insecure environment. The immediate
answer to their security dilemma has been
to reallocate greater percentages of project
funding to paying for private security. In ad-
dition to the problem that funds allocated
for development are being rerouted to pri-
vate security companies, there is the larger
concern that the use of private security will
become institutionalized in not only devel-
opment, but also in humanitarian peace
keeping missions.
The UN Secretary General concluded
his speech cited above by asking a difficult
question: "Have our strategies and our op-
erational practice on the ground kept pace
with the ever-increasing demand for human
protection?"8 The phrase "ever-increasing
demand for human protection" is particu-
larly troubling. Just as US defense, intel-
ligence and development agency officials
claim there is an ever-increasing demand
for their services thus, expanding their man-
date, Ban Ki-Moon is suggesting that the
UN has insufficient resources and opera-
tional capacity in conjunction with ever-in-
creasing responsibilities to protect people.
Since the current debate is centered around
who is responsible for protecting civilians
in lieu of a responsible state, the question
that remains unaddressed is who is then ac-
countable to those very civilians in lieu of a
responsible state? Does a UN-style contin-
gent sovereignty backed by various inter-
national NGOs and development agencies
ensure any sort of direct accountability to
citizens? When the responsibility to protect
bleeds into the responsibility to reconstruct,
the mismatch between capacity levels and
the scope of mandate leaves a large vacu-
um that can be filled by the private sector.
The use of the private sector further compli-
cates the question of accountability posed
above. How can we ensure accountability
of private actors working under an interna-
tional mandate to provide development and
security services in a state that has failed to
do so?
Malcolm Hugh Patterson, an Austra-
lian international law scholar, has argued in
his 2009 book Privatising Peace: A Corpo-
rate Adjunct to United Nations Peacekeep-
ing and Humanitarian Operations that the
failures of UN peacekeeping operations can
be remedied by the use of private military
contractors.85 As a lawyer, he believes that
within an appropriate legal regime, private
contractors can be effectively utilized to
hold egregious human rights violators ac-
countable. Rule of law is once again the de-
fault accountability framework with little or
no consideration towards the complex and
murky context of war.
Patterson's suggestion that the UN
should responsibly utilize PMSCs, turning
mercenaries into UN peacekeepers, may
not be a distant reality considering the pres-
ent R2P mindset. Afterall, Blackwater can
certainly provide the helicopters UN peace-
keeping missions require, but member
states won't provide. If the UN uses private
contractors to enforce its obligations un-
der R2P, then it would represent two types
of state failure. First, the state that fails to
protect its population requires international
intervention. And, second, the international
community fails to effectively intervene in
the humanitarian crisis without relying on
private contractors. In both cases, state
sovereignty as a concept is slowly rendered
into oblivion.
Mainstream human rights lawyers do
not embrace Patterson's view that PMSCs
should be the default security option of UN
peacekeeping missions, but do endorse a
stronger legal accountability framework
for PMSCs. In order to further contextual-
ize the challenges of accountability in the
security-development nexus, let us revisit
the DynCorp-Cassals merger mentioned at
the beginning of this chapter. DynCorp was
hired to train peacekeepers in Bosnia in the
1990s. It was however, revealed through
various journalist and whistleblower reports
that several employees "were implicated in
sex crimes, prostitution rackets, and illegal
arms trafficking." "One site supervisor even
taped himself raping two women. The worst
offenders were fired, the whistleblowers
were also fired, but employees could not be
prosecuted due to the terms of the Dayton
Accords peace agreement. They were out-
side US legal jurisdiction." 86
Even if the Bosnian cases are dis-
missed as rare occurrences of egregious hu-
man rights violations by private contractors
in a vacuum of legal jurisdiction, DynCorp
has not necessarily evolved in its handling
of human rights violations in the past two
decades. Wikileaks released a June 2009
American diplomatic cable from Afghani-
stan, which confirmed a journalist's sus-
picion that DynCorp workers employed to
train Afghan police forces paid for "dancing
boys" or child prostitutes and drugs to enter-
tain Afghan policeman in Kunduz. Paying for
dancing boys is explicitly prohibited under
Afghani sharia law. Hanif Atmar, the Afghan
Minister of Interior, had asked the assistant
US ambassador at the time to "quash" the
story and accompanying video of the event.
As public opinion in Afghanistan was turn-
ing against private security companies, the
Kunduz scandal would only inflame popular
passion. Though Atmar did not want a pub-
lic airing of DynCorp's laundry because he
prioritized training for Afghan policeman, he
did express that overall "contractors were
not producing what was desired."87
When the Washington Post broke the
story in July 2009, the DynCorp spokesper-
son Douglas Ebner stated:
We're absolutely dedicated to a framework
for governance and compliance that ensures
a transparent and accountable business
environment. Whether it's misconduct, or
public perception or allegations of miscon-
duct, these can tarnish a company's ability
to work in challenging environments. Don't
mistake an individual act of misconduct for
a corporate failure to respond.88
Despite Ebner's attempt to distance the
DynCorp Corporation from the actions of
DynCorp employees, this event was one in
a row of allegations of murder, abuse and
fraud against private security contractors
that led Hamid Karzai to finally enforce the
ban on PMSCs in Afghanistan in November
2010.
Political analysts have argued that
in addition to human rights and criminal
violations, the presence of private secu-
rity contractors poses a political threat to
Karzai's government. Nevertheless, since
the enforcement of the ban in November
2010, six-billion dollars of USAID funding
for health, infrastructure, agriculture and en-
ergy projects was frozen in Afghanistan. A
USAID official explained, "No new develop-
ment projects can get underway because
they [private development firms] can't con-
tract security."89
Due to the vast number of for-profit,
non-profit and government development
agencies on the ground, military forces are
overextended and can't meet their security
demands. In Kandahar's Panjawaii District,
Major Mike Blanchette who oversees Ca-
nadian operations explains, "we can't se-
cure every road improvement project, there
is simply not enough coalition forces to do
that. A lot of these [private security] compa-
nies fulfill an important need that does con-
tribute to the good guys cause in terms of
improving things and what not."90 However,
given the general, albeit somewhat begrudg-
ing consensus from military, development
and government actors that private security
companies are integral to both providing se-
curity and training national security forces,
Karzai's administration had no choice but to
issue an exemption for development agen-
cies to contract security as long as the firms
were properly licensed and regulated. 91
Accountability of PMSCs has gar-
nered much of the media attention. Their
large weapons, mercenary attitudes and no-
torious human rights violations have largely
overshadowed the role of private civilian
contractors in the massive US-funded re-
construction and development enterprise in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Development is now
considered part and parcel to the security
and stabilization efforts in both theatres. Our
present war has extended far beyond the
traditional objective of military operations,
and determined to capture the "hearts and
minds" of the populations. This approach
leads to the unholy marriage of long-term
development goals with short-term military
objectives, and further complicates the proj-
ect of accountability.
Though the military was traditionally
seen as the harbinger of security, Mark Duff-
ield argues that development is now seen
as the real "technology of security."92 See-
ing development as central to liberal forms
of power and governance, Duffield employs
the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics to sug-
gest that development functions to govern
marginalized populations by managing "un-
derdevelopment's destabilizing effects."93
In other words, he claims that develop-
ment has always been a form of counter-
insurgency. Development masquerading as
security has facilitated the dramatic rise of
the private development industry over the
past half century, but increasingly so in the
last decade. Since 2001, USAID has seen
its budget ballooning every year to support
the expanded mandate of coordinating re-
construction and development projects in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The expansion of the
agency mandate and funding however, as
mentioned before was not accompanied by
a comparable increase in personnel and ca-
pacity.
USAID was first integrated into this
security-development nexus through the
establishment of the Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Teams (PRT) in 2003. The PRTs were
to engender Afghan government capacity
through supporting provincial governors in
insecure areas and thus, they were "seen as
a means for dealing with the causes of Af-
ghanistan's instability: terrorism, warlords,
unemployment and grinding poverty."94 The
American PRTs between 2004-2005, in con-
trast with the German- or British-led PRTs,
focused on village improvement projects to
win the hearts and minds in the 'Taliban's
spiritual heartland.' 95
Modern PRTs in Afghanistan and
Iraq are an improvisation on past attempts
in civil-military integration such as the Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Department
Support (CORDS) organization used in the
Vietnam War. Today, PRTs in Afghanistan in-
clude US soldiers, civilian contractors, and
representatives from USAID, US Depart-
ment of Agriculture and Afghan Ministry of
the Interior. The ambitious, three-pronged
goals of the PRTs-Governance, Security
and Reconstruction-are being implement-
ed by individuals with entirely different insti-
tutional mandates or as Robert Perito calls
them "corporate cultures," funding struc-
tures, modes of operation and thinking. In
addition to this basic challenge of coordina-
tion, many of the deployed agency and army
representatives have little to no pre-deploy-
ment training, adequate language or area
expertise, and have to learn on the job.96 In
fact, since USAID had only a thousand For-
eign Service Officers worldwide, they often
sent in new hires straight out of graduate
school or had to hire Personal Service Con-
tractors to fill USAID spots in PRTs. 7
Though 'reconstruction' or more ap-
propriately, development is emphasized in
the name of PRTs, they are primarily a mili-
tary organization, which has had significant
challenges in implementing development
projects. The military's "spend and build"
strategy led to the building of schools and
clinics without teachers or doctors to staff
them. Moreover, the reliance on local con-
tractors without any oversight or inspection
meant that "PRT-sponsored buildings de-
veloped structural problems, became un-
usable, or simply collapsed altogether."98
It was this phenomenon of collapsing PRT
projects that led Integrity Watch Afghani-
stan to empower local community members
to monitor the PRT-funded school in Jabal
Saraj.
PRT development projects have had
numerous successes and failures-not all
buildings have collapsed-but their real
strength has been in supporting security
sector reform. Even if PRTs had excelled
at kick-starting the development process
in Afghanistan, they have failed to address
one key issue: being accountable to the Af-
ghan public they serve. The United States
Institute of Peace conducted an oral history
project with various members of PRTs in Af-
ghanistan. Many of them mentioned that the
lack of accountability, in that Afghan civil-
ians are seen as passive recipients of de-
velopment assistance as opposed to claim-
ants with rights to hold PRTs accountable,
which threatens the sustainability of PRT
projects. 99
The USIP Oral History Project inter-
viewed the USAID programme officer in Af-
ghanistan in 2005 on the role of USAID in
PRTs. He explained that first, only 5% of
USAID's budget in Afghanistan was allocat-
ed to PRT projects. During the interview, he
expressed three reservations and key issues
of the PRTs, (1) Development agencies and
NGOs believe PRTs destroy their neutrality
and expose them to violent attacks by blur-
ring the line between humanitarian and mili-
tary objectives,1001 01 (2) PRTs are not seen
as an extension of the central Afghan gov-
ernment, rather an occupying entity that is
contained within a military fortress and thus,
Afghans do not feel any direct connection
with PRTs and (3) Civil affairs soldiers work-
ing on development simply failed to grasp
that "development takes a very long time." 102
Development and security oper-
ate in fundamentally different time frames.
The objectives of one do not neatly overlap
on the other. The challenges faced by the
PRTs in implementing small, rapid devel-
opment projects, such as contractor cor-
ruption, lack of accountability to commu-
nities, inadequate security provision and
lack of expertise are representative of the
larger challenges facing the US-funded re-
construction and development enterprise in
Afghanistan. If only 5% of USAID develop-
ment funds was allocated to PRTs, then the
other 95% were for country-wide develop-
ment projects implemented entirely through
the use of private development contractors.
The PRTs made a point to hire only Afghan
contractors, whereas the bulk of USAID
projects were originally and continue to be
implemented by a few, massive private US
development contractors.
Between 2007 and 2009, the ma-
jor USAID contractors in Afghanistan were
Chemonics, DAI, Louis Berger Group, Asso-
ciation for Rural Development and Bearing-
Point. And each of these prime contractors
hired international private security firms like
G4S, Blue Hackle and Edinburgh Interna-
tional or Afghan PSCs like Watan Risk Man-
agement. It is worthy to note that in January
2011, the Afghan government cited sixteen
PSCs as "worst offenders" for crimes like
tax evasion, keeping unlicensed armored
vehicles, employing more guards than al-
lowed, using unregistered weapons. Many
of these firms, like Blue Hackle and G4S,
provide security for USAID-funded projects
and so provoked outrage among the de-
velopment community. An Afghan official's
rationale for disbanding these firms was to
allow room to "strengthen first the Afghan
institutions," and many of the local militia-
based PSCs could be integrated into the
formal security forces as part of the DDR
program instead of perpetuating a parallel,
security structure that undermines Afghan
state sovereignty.103
The unquestioned security-devel-
opment nexus thus, continues to expand
without addressing the underlying concern
about accountability. Since the war in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, the utility and the dan-
gers of using private contractors has been
part of policy discourse.104 Yet despite the
promulgation of new legislation, national
licensing regulations, corporate codes of
conducts, and voluntary agreements (e.g.
UN Anti-Trafficking Law, MEJA, IPOA code
of conduct) to hold private contractors ac-
countable, the challenges of accountability
remain largely the same. Legal accountabil-
ity mechanisms continue to be undermined
by jurisdictional disputes, weak national
licensing standards (or enforcement) and
ultimately the lengthy and expensive legal
battle that prevents effective access to rem-
edy. The next chapter will evaluate some of
these human rights-based, legal account-
ability mechanisms in greater detail.
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4. EVALUATING
EXISTING
ACCOUNTABILITY
FRAME WORKS
Any accountability framework that
calls for increased legal, bureaucratic, politi-
cal and professional mechanisms to better
manage development and security contrac-
tors, also risks the further institutionalization
and embedding of private contractors in
the modern development enterprise. If ac-
countability is expanded to include the end
beneficiary, then it is possible to question
the use of private development and security
contractors in post-conflict reconstruction
and development.
The primary contractor accountabil-
ity challenges in wartime as mentioned be-
fore are:
(1) Multiple tiers of contracts and subcon-
tracts diffuse responsibility for project out-
come among numerous actors and relying
on a complex web of accountabilities to get
the project done.(2) Insecurity and perceptions of insecurity
decrease monitoring and evaluation visits,
duration of the visits, while increasing secu-
rity costs(3) The combining of security and develop-
ment objectives can be a hindrance to trust
building between beneficiary groups and
project implementers.105
The following set of American ac-
countability reforms, emerging from the
public administration, anti-corruption and
human rights discourse, has tried to address
these issues. This chapter examines some
of the current procurement, evaluation,
monitoring and oversight reforms to see if
they do in fact address the core challenges
of accountability in post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. More importantly, this chapter will see
how these mechanisms can be adapted to
create accountability relationships between
the project implementers and beneficiaries
in the early postwar reconstruction period
(when the state has not yet rebuilt any gov-
erning capacity, more like the Afghan state
between 2001 and 2006).
Public Administration Frame
Since this thesis examines the phe-
nomenon of public agencies, such as US-
AID, contracting out much of their core re-
sponsibilities, it is important to first examine
how accountability is framed in public ad-
ministration discourse. The question is not
whether private contractors are accountable
or not. Rather we must ask what types of
accountability are they subjected to and are
these appropriate to preventing and punish-
ing waste, fraud, abuse and human rights
violations in conflict.
Accountability as explained by pub-
lic administration scholars such as Richard
Mulgan requires three basic conditions:
1) The existence of an individual or body
that is external to the subject being held ac-
countable,
2) A forum for social exchange and inter-
action for one party to seek "answers and
rectification while the other side, that being
held accountable, responds and accepts
sanctions," and
3) The ones calling for the account must
have the rights of authority over those being
held accountable.98
Early 20th century scholars such as Carl
Friedrich and Herman Finer debated wheth-
er professional accountability of public ser-
vants to the public was an internal or ex-
ternal process. Friedrich emphasized the
"inward responsibility of public servants to
their professional standards," whereas Finer
believed that accountability is an external
relationship between one individual to an-
other.106
In 1987, Barbara S. Romzek and Mel-
vin J. Dubnick analyzed the issue of pub-
lic sector accountability following the 1986
explosion of the space shuttle Challenger.
They further developed Friedrich and Finer's
debate through their analysis of the Chal-
lenger incident.107 This led them to create a
typology of accountability systems for pub-
lic agencies.
Romzek & Dubnick's
Types of Accountability Systems (1987)
Source of Agency Control
Internal
Degree of High
Control over
Agency Actions
1- Bureaucratic
Low 3. Professional
External
2. Legal
4. Political
Bureaucratic accountability (US)
is largely hierarchical, where the top agen-
cy administrator sets the priorities and all
subordinates must comply with orders from
above. Accountability is enforced using
"close supervision or a surrogate system
of standard operating procedures or clearly
stated rules and regulations."108 This form of
accountability is clearly evident in agencies
such as USAID, DoD, and DoS who have
laid out extensive sets of rules and stan-
dard operating procedures for contract bid-
ding, contract assessment, budgeting and
procurement. Reporting between agencies,
contractors and subcontractors is the pre-
ferred method of communication to ensure
accountability in a bureaucratic context.
For instance, in a 2005 quarterly re-
port from DAI to USAID, they noted the
submission of the following reports to meet
their contract requirements: (1) Program Im-
plementation Strategy, (2) Program Perfor-
mance Management Plan, (3) Life of Project
Work Plan, (4) Year One Annual Work Plan
and (5) Inventory of On-Going Alternative
Livelihoods Assistance in the Region and
Proposed Coordination Strategy.109 Though
reporting mechanisms are supposed to be
accompanied by frequent site visits by a
USAID representative to check on the con-
tractor's progress, site visits especially to
rural areas are often hindered or reduced in
frequency due to variable security risks.
Legal accountability involves an
external body that has the ability or power
to "impose legal sanctions or assert formal
contractual obligations."1 0 Unlike the hierar-
chy of bureaucratic accountability, Romzek
and Dubnick theorize that legal accountabil-
ity is based on two relatively equal and inde-
pendent bodies culminating in a principal-
agent relationship. The Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) are a set of laws that the
Department of Justice (DoJ) can use to as-
certain whether state agencies are comply-
ing with appropriate contracting practices
(bidding, procurement, evaluation).
Contractors that violate the FAR are
subject to fines, suspension, debarment
and prosecution. The FAR thus, enables
USAID to use legal accountability mecha-
nism to ensure contractors adhere to their
commitments. Contractor firms or individu-
als that are under investigation, prosecuted
or fined are recorded in the Excluded Parties
List System (EPLS)."' The establishment of
the Congressional Commission on Wartime
Contracting is an example of congressional
monitoring of compliance of government
agencies and contractors with FAR regula-
tions. The CWC however, is not a legal ac-
countability mechanism in itself because it
cannot impose legal sanctions. Rather, it
falls into the next category of political ac-
countability.
Political accountability requires an
individual or agency to be responsive to the
constituency that they represent. This can
include "the general public, elected offi-
cials, agency heads, agency clientele, other
special interest groups, and future genera-
Analogous Relationship
(Controller/Administrator)
Romzek & Dubnick's
Relationships within
Accountability Systems (1987)
3. Professional
4. Political
tions." 12 The movement for transparency in
government largely relies on this notion of
accountability to the people.
The CWC was a congressional, and
by extension political, committee set up to
investigate inefficient and some outright
harmful wartime contingency contracting
practices. In the course of their investiga-
tions and hearings, they have uncovered
numerous instances of noncompliance with
FAR regulations. They have also revealed
broader structural problems with how con-
tracting has become the default mode of op-
eration and must be reexamined as a prac-
tice in itself. As a bipartisan congressional
committee though, they cannot enforce their
findings or impose sanctions. They serve in
an advisory capacity to congress and can
inform future policy decisions and contract-
ing reforms. The CWC is also a response to
media reports of rampant contractor fraud
and waste, which can quickly diminish do-
mestic support for war and state-building
operations abroad.
This type of accountability is not only
important for the country at war or con-
duction reconstruction efforts abroad, but
it is also extremely important as a way to
increase the legitimacy of the Afghan state
through state building and reconstruction
efforts. That's why civil society groups like
Supervision
Fiduciary
Deference to expertise
Responsiveness
Superior/subordinate
Lawmaker/law executor
Principal/agent
Layperson/expert
Constituent/representative
Integrity Watch Afghanistan rely on the re-
sponsiveness element of political account-
ability to empower local communities to
monitor development projects, while simul-
taneously engaging their local government
to apply pressure to contractors.
And, herein lies the paradox of the
American development enterprise at war.
The rationale for rapid and expensive recon-
struction efforts in Afghanistan have been
justified in America on the grounds that it
will increase legitimacy of the Afghan state,
while delegitimizing the support base for the
competing Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Contrac-
tor fraud and corruption, even in the more
benign form of highly paid foreign consul-
tants that are viewed as corrupt, is counter-
productive to engendering a system of po-
litical accountability in Afghanistan.
Professional accountability, the
third form, is the most applicable to our
framing of private development and secu-
rity firms. Professional accountability occurs
when "public officials must rely on skilled
and expert employees to provide appropri-
ate solutions."'13 The public official in this
instance becomes a layperson that must
rely on and trust the expert to provide qual-
ity work. If the expert falls through, the lay
official would hopefully be able to hold them
accountable and fire them if necessary. US-
Type of
Accountability
System
I. Bureaucratic
Basis of
Relationship
2. Legal
AID, like other agencies, is perhaps becom-
ing a "lay institution" deferring to private de-
velopment "experts" in the secret hope that
they will hold themselves accountable for
both ethical budgeting and positive devel-
opment outcomes.
When the Rogers Commission Report
presented its analysis of the gap in NASA's
accountability to account for Challenger,
Romzek and Dubnick offered an alterna-
tive perspective that did not focus on gaps,
but rather on what types of accountability
were being emphasized. Due to the incred-
ibly technical nature of NASA's operations,
the agency largely relied on professional ac-
countability in the 1960s and 1970s. Due to
congressional pressures in the 1970s how-
ever, NASA experienced major budget cuts.
40% of NASA's staff was cut and between
1970 and 1986, the quality control staff was
cut by 71 %.114
Under the dual pressures to decen-
tralize and privatize, NASA began to rely on
bureaucratic accountability mechanisms to
maintain linkages between various depart-
ments and subheads. The agency also be-
gan to use contractors, who "in addition
to any technical and financial benefits they
provided NASA, contractors had always
proved very helpful politically in establishing
support for the agency's programs and an-
nual funding requests."'1 5
Romzek and Dubnick's powerful in-
sight into the relationships between contrac-
tors and political support is really important
in understanding the role contractors con-
tinue to play for the modern development
enterprise constantly under threat of budget
cuts and increasing political scrutiny. Func-
tionally, the use of contractors replaced the
traditional supervisor-subordinate relation-
ship found in bureaucratic accountability
with a superordinate-subordinate relation-
ship. Contracts provide a legal framework to
demand better performance at lower costs
since public agency managers no longer
have to incur the "costs associated with di-
rectly maintaining professional accountabil-
ity mechanisms." 116
In the case of private development
contractors, they are hired because of their
expertise. However, public agencies rely on
the firm's internal bureaucratic and profes-
sional accountability systems in place of
direct governmental supervision. It is no
surprise then that Inspector Generals of all
agencies using contractors in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan have found that public agency of-
ficials lack direct knowledge and ability to
measure contractor performance.
The response to the Challenger ex-
plosion was to call for greater accountability.
In this case, there were calls for an external
oversight body to review safety standards,
the creation of checklists and guidelines to
follow when preparing for a space shuttle
launch or hiring famous ex-astronauts to
bring up both the technical and celebrity
profile of the NASA program. Despite the se-
ries of accountability reforms within NASA,
seventeen years later on February 1, 2003
the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated
upon re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB) cited similarities to the findings of
the Roger's Commission.1 17 Despite prior
knowledge of technical problems like in the
Challenger launch, the decision-makers in
NASA's upper management decided to pro-
ceed with the Columbia mission.
The two space shuttle accidents, fol-
lowed by the establishment of two commis-
sions to investigate the accidents (identify
lapses in accountability and recommend re-
forms) offer a distant, but related parallel to
the issue of contractor accountability today.
The accountability machine is reinvigorated
in cycles, usually after a crisis or during a
war. It offers a tremendous opportunity for
reform, but one that can easily be hindered
by generic resorts to bureaucratic and le-
gal tinkering that result in yet another crisis,
albeit somewhat deferred, such as the Co-
lumbia explosion. Though private develop-
ment contractor corruption is not nearly as
shocking as the technical and managerial
failures that led to these space shuttle ac-
cidents, it has tremendous relevance for the
well being and prosperity of Afghans that
have endured several decades of conflict,
international peace-building attempts and
politicized aid operations.118
Current Public Administration
Reforms
Procurement: Peacetime Rules for Wartime?
USAID Forward is a set of procure-
ment and contracting reforms that seek to
manage contractors better-better to what
end? One of the key criticisms of the current
USAID procurement policies is its reliance
on a small cohort of private development
contractors that continue to receive the li-
on's share of USAID contracts, cooperative
agreements and grants. Some have titled
these companies the "beltway bandits" to
indicate their concentration inside the 1-495
highway around Washington. Though not all
of the prominent contractors are located in
this area, the close proximity of many con-
tractors illustrates the evolution of the de-
velopment-industrial complex.
The CWC in particular, is concerned
that American taxpayers are not getting the
"best value" or "efficiency" that they are pay-
ing for in Afghanistan. But these complaints
are simply not a unique phenomenon in the
history of US procurement policy. Steven L.
Schooner, a legal expert on US procurement
laws, outlines nine competing objectives of
government procurement systems.119 I have
organized them under the categories "Free
Market Ethics," "Consumer Values," and
"Checks on Free Market Competition" (see
right).
In this table, the desire to implant free-
market ethics like fair competition, integrity
and transparency are compatible with the
American taxpayer's desire to know how her
money is spent so she can get the best deal.
The use of procurement for wealth distribu-
tion, risk avoidance and uniformity however,
can contradict with free-market ethics for
the best consumer value, because they en-
courage selective awarding of contracts on
the basis of catering to underrepresented
firms or relying on a well-seasoned contrac-
tors whose business practices, organiza-
tional structure and capacity cater primarily
to their primary client-the government.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there has
been a historic co-evolution of USAID and
the private development industry. The fact
that USAID has consistently relied on the
same group of contractors for several de-
cades may appear to counter fair procure-
ment practices on the surface. Full and open
competition in bidding and procurement
processes is a cornerstone of anti-corrup-
tion practices as advocated by OECD and
Transparency International. They are also
enshrined in US law through the Competi-
tion in Contract Act of 1984 and Federal Ac-
quisition Regulations that clearly state:
Government business shall be conducted...
with complete impartiality and with prefer-
ential treatment for none. The general rule
is to avoid strictly any conflict of interest or
even the appearance of a conflict of interest
in Government-contractor relationships.12 0
But as Schooner points out that along
with a desire for transparency and cost-ef-
ficiency, there is a competing desire to use
procurement for wealth distribution or cul-
tivate "specific manufacturers to maintain
sufficient expertise or industrial base capac-
USAID Forward Key Points
Key Objectives of USAID Forward's Implementation & Procurement Reform
1. Strengthen partner country capacity to improve aid effectiveness and sustainability by increasing
use of reliable partner country systems and institutions to provide support to partner countries.
2. Strengthen local civil society and private sector capacity to Improve aid effectiveness and
sustainability, by working closely with our implementing partners on capacity building and local grant
and contract allocations.
3. Increase competition and broaden USAID's partner base, by increasing the number of prime
contract awards and percentage of total dollars obligated to U.S. based small and disadvantaged
businesses and small NGOs (while decreasing the number and value of large pre-competed
contracts).
4. Use USG resources more efficiently and effectively, by increasing the number of fixed price
contracts where feasible and appropriate, decreasing the use of 'high-risk' procurement methods,
and harmonizing procurement approaches with other US government agencies working in the same
substantive areas.
5. Strengthen collaboration and partnership with bilateral donors, multilateral and international
organizations to increase synergies and avoid duplication.
6. Rebuild USAID's internal technical capacity and rebalance the workforce, working with the Talent
Management Reform initiative.
Steven L. Schooner's 9 Objectives of Government Procurement
Integrity
Transparency
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Customer Satisfaction Risk Avoidance
Best Value Uniformity
A3 Key Points
USAID A' (Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan) initiative
1. Restnct to the number of subcontract tiers and eliminate subcontracts with brokers who provide no value;
2. Tighten financial controls to establish auditing procedures for 100 percent of locally incurred project costs and
advocate increased use of electronic funds transfers;
3. Perform additional project oversight in high-risk areas, utilizing multiple monitoring techniques and delegating
more oversight authority to USAID field staff; and
4. Conduct background investigations on Afghan and third-country companies and individuals who work on
USAID projects to thoroughly vet our partners.
ity in anticipation of future contingencies." 21
The private development industry (and also
the private security industry) is what Schoo-
ner calls the "industrial base capacity" on
which agencies like USAID consistently rely.
Wealth distribution in the US domes-
tic case has historically meant awarding
government contracts to competitive, but
smaller firms or even minority-owned firms
in the case of affirmative action. This is
mentioned in USAID Forward's third objec-
tive that seeks to "increase competition and
broaden USAID's partner base." Is this re-
ally going forward or simply reiterating what
the agency should have been doing since
the 1960s? Reliance on a greater number of
contractors does not mean decreasing reli-
ance on the small cohort of prime contrac-
tors. It also means that despite the CWC's
cautioning against overreliance on contrac-
tors, current USAID implementation reforms
merely reinstitute the practice of develop-
ment through contract.
The multiple tiers of contracting and
subcontracting are a major challenge for
contractor accountability during wartime,
because every tier decreases visibility and
control over actual project outcomes, while
increasing opportunities for financial exploi-
tation. If at present, it is difficult to adequate-
ly monitor and evaluate even a small group
of large, private development contractors, it
remains unclear through the USAID reform
agenda how even an increase in numbers
and technical capacity of USAID personnel
can keep up with the objective of increasing
the number of contracts to provide opportu-
nities for smaller firms and NGOs. Moreover,
the broader USAID reform agenda does not
suggest a limit on the tiers of subcontract-
ing allowed or how to ensure subcontrac-
tors are accountable not only to their direct
clients, but also to the project beneficiaries
(the community or country they are working
for) and the project donor (USAID). Though
the USAID A3 initiative does suggest re-
stricting subcontract tiers and eliminating
"brokers who provide no value," that is only
possible through the presence of an active
USAID field staff that has the time and abili-
ty to gauge the subcontractor's value before
the contract is awarded.
In the Afghan case, procurement is
strategized as a wealth distribution strategy
in the form of the "Afghan First" initiative,
which encourages agencies under the US
Mission to Afghanistan to rely on Afghan
firms for supplies and services. Most often,
this means the use of Afghan subcontrac-
tors, while USAID's sole-source, costs-plus
and fixed-cost contracts continue to be
awarded to the small cohort of private de-
velopment firms mentioned above. But, one
of the largest challenges in fair and transpar-
ent procurement policies is that especially
in the early years, Afghan subcontractors
were not always familiar with the convolut-
ed FAR-mandated bidding procedures and
the additional procurement requirements
of each individual contracting agency (US-
ACE, USAID, DoD, DoS). This limited the
pool to larger American or regional (Turk-
ish, Pakistan, UAE, Jordan) subcontractors
that could quickly put together compelling
bids with strong marketing skills. Moreover,
strong marketing and design skills that used
"appealing but unrealistic project simula-
tions" combined with the Prime Contrac-
tor's promise to use costly, though innova-
tive materials such as Chemcrete122 justified
drastically higher project costs.123
A USACE senior engineer explained
that if you seriously wanted Afghan or Iraqi
subcontractors to be competitive with Turk-
ish and American subcontractors, then it was
necessary to first simply FAR regulations to
make it easier to bid and also conduct train-
ing sessions in US contract bidding pro-
cesses.124 He added that the mere fact that
a government procurement jobs website
FedBizOpps.gov or USAID.gov/Procure-
mentBusPpp was used as a taken-for-
granted reference for subcontractors to dis-
cover opportunities indicates the large gap
between American business-as-usual prac-
tices in post-conflict reconstruction and lo-
cal contractors' impediments to benefit from
the "Afghan First" or "Iraqi First" initiatives.
When procurement training seminars
are actually conducted for Afghan or Iraqi
contractors, the seminars are initiated by
American prime contractors like DAI, Inc.
in Afghanistan or BearingPoint in Iraq. A
two-day seminar conducted by DAI in Ka-
bul, entitled "USAID Award Compliance for
Development Professionals" costs $795 to
attend-an unbelievable price considering it
is much higher than most Afghans' monthly
salaries.125
From 2002 to 2010, the 'spending
imperative' has released a flurry of con-
tracting funds into Afghanistan. Each time
the failures of monitoring, evaluation and
financial controls are brought up, contrac-
tors and USAID management cite the lack
of security, high turn-over and short tenures
of USAID field staff and lack of Afghan gov-
ernmental and civilian capacity for these
shortcomings. If A3 or USAID Forward were
implemented in 2002 at the heels of the re-
construction activity, would the results have
been any different? 'Peacetime' contract-
ing reforms, especially those in response to
congressional scrutiny during a budget cri-
sis, do not necessarily address the account-
ability challenges in a conflict setting.
Though this implementation, pro-
curement and evaluation reform is neces-
sary for USAID in general to improve de-
velopment operations in countries that are
not embroiled in conflict, they simply do not
address the wartime challenges that led to
the intense scrutiny of their operations in the
first place.
In fact, an interview with an Afghan
engineer126 who had worked on various US-
AID projects, including those implemented
by IOM and a private development contrac-
tor Emerging Markets Group, Ltd, revealed
that much of the contractor corruption was
due to specific security concerns.
A USAID-OIG report from March
2011 accordingly found that "IOM approved
materials that did not meet the minimum ac-
ceptance criteria" in their own quality con-
trol manual.127 The issue of inflated costs
has also been documented in USAID-OIG's
investigation into the Development Alterna-
tives Inc. Jalalabad office, which is imple-
menting part of USAID's Local Governance
and Community Development project: 128
In addition to citing cost inflations,
the memorandum mentioned how DAI em-
ployees "were working in collusion to fabri-
cate monitoring reports" by taking "bogus
photographs or use photographs from other
projects." 129 Projects that escaped frequent
monitoring visits due to high security risks
would generate the most opportunities for
kickback schemes and exploitation.
This particular USAID-OIG memoran-
dum was in response to more alarming re-
ports of private security contractors paying
off local insurgents, including the Taliban in
return for safe passage of supply convoys.
One newspaper article carried the headline
"Taxpayer Money Funneled to Taliban" right
after the release of the memo.130 After au-
diting DAI's private security contractor Ed-
inburgh International, the OIG determined
that no suspicious transfers were found.
The focus then shifted to DAI's subcontrac-
tors who were in charge of stabilization and
community development aspects of the
project. The OIG recommended that "US-
AID/Afghanistan conduct appropriate risk
and impact assessments.. .to determine
whether the security environment in those
locations is permissive enough to allow ci-
vilian implementation and monitoring efforts
to proceed without interference from insur-
gent groups."131
0IG's recommendation above is yet
another example of competing objectives
for conducting development in insecure
areas to win the "hearts and minds" of Af-
ghans versus conducting development in a
FAR-compliant, transparent, corruption-free
and low-risk manner. During a public pre-
sentation on reconstruction efforts, Briga-
dier General Peter A. DeLuca speaking from
his experiences with the US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) in Iraq and Afghanistan,
expressed the gaps between peacetime reg-
ulations and wartime challenges. He stated
simply "the paper isn't going to be perfect,"
which meant that you are not going to have
a "DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency]-
operable audit" in a warzone.132 This may
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suggest that FAR regulations are important
as a baseline aspirational standard, but if
the project implementers on the ground
neither have the time, nor the patience to
follow each and every regulation, then it is
important to be clear about when transpar-
ency and when haste is the main priority.
DeLuca followed up his comments
with a reflection on USAID. Since USAID
uses USACE as a contractor, the two agen-
cies have a basic understanding of each
other's operational strengths and weak-
nesses. He stated that since the State De-
partment and USAID do not have person-
nel "on hand to deploy" and work in active
conflicts, the "AID model is not good for do-
ing reconstruction in a compressed timeline
with conflict." It seems unfair to judge an
agency's performance based on their work
in a conflict zone, if the agency is not even
internally structured to manage reconstruc-
tion efforts in conflict. The bought-in capac-
ity that contractors and consultants provide
100 4,500.00
Material Cost Inflation: The engineer (from here on will be referred to as Engineer "A") who was in charge of
project monitoring explained how local subcontractors design cost sheets. 'A illustrated if it costs $2 per
square meter to paint the school, then the contractor could price it as high as $45. Though this example
seemed outrageous to the engineer, when "A" reported material cost inflations to the project supervisor,
who reports directly to USAID-Kabul, the response was summed up in a shrug. Cost inflation is tolerated,
*A" explained, because the aid agency and upstream contractors know that in order to construct in an
insecure area, local contractors have to pay off certain warlords, police or even the Taliban. In fact, when a
development project is announced in a given area, "A claimed that the local gunman would even approach
the contractor himself and demand a cut up front, anywhere from 15-20%. In cases where cost inflation did
not cover the extra costs incurred by the contractor, cheaper materials would be used.
Shovel 6.00 3.20 100 280.00
Water bucket 10.00 2.00 100 800.00
Pickaxe 6.00 4.00 100 200.00
is only as efficient as the agency's ability to
manage that capacity. The key component
in reconstruction work during conflict is not
only having adequate security, but also the
element of adequate time.
USAID's accountability reforms such
as A3, USAID Forward and Afghan First are
simply not tailored to prevent and punish
contractor fraud in a timely fashion as proj-
ects are underway. What the Afghan engi-
neer revealed about cost inflations used for
paying off insurgents was common knowl-
edge to local and foreign aid workers as
early as 2004.133 The USAID memorandum
investigating the real cost of security in Af-
ghanistan was only released in September
2010.
Anti-Corruption Frame
"If you take US $10 Million from the US
government and sub the job out to Iraqi
businesses for US $250,000, is that busi-
ness, or is it corruption?" 3
-Ed Kubba, Member
American-Iraqi Chamber of Commerce
13 January 2009
For international development prac-
titioners, corruption in reconstruction and
development projects should be a major
concern. Anti-corruption scholars like Chey-
anne Scharbatke-Church and Kirby Reiling
have argued that dealing with corruption
should be a priority during peace building,
rather than treated as a marginal concern
for accountants and lawyers. 131 Since re-
construction and development projects are
critical processes of reallocating resources,
corruption can "exclude vast swathes of the
population from decision-making and ac-
cess to resources." 136
The most widely accepted definition
of corruption is the one popularized by the
prominent anti-corruption NGO Transparen-
cy International (TI): "the abuse of entrusted
power for private gain." 137 This definition is a
refinement of Joseph S. Nye's classic 1967
definition: "Corruption is behavior that devi-
ates from the formal duties of a public role
because of private regarding, pecuniary or
status gains." 138 When devising accountabil-
ity frameworks for private contractors, both
Nye and TI's definitions pose a conceptual
problem. Accountability resides firmly within
a public body that must not deviate from its
formal, entrusted role. This public framing of
corruption has a direct impact on how anti-
corruption strategies are designed. The UN,
OSCE and TI have all published widely dis-
persed anti-corruption toolkits. The OSCE's
2004 "Best Practices in Combating Corrup-
tion" handbook as an example, covers many
high risk sectors, the "Conflict of Interest,"
"Public Procurement," and "Building and
Maintaining an Ethical Public Administra-
tion" are the most pertinent for this thesis.
For instance, in the "Building and
Maintaining an Ethical Public Administra-
tion" section, they recommend "adequate
accountability mechanisms should be in
place within the public service." 139 The
OSCE seems to rely on the internal, profes-
sional accountability of civil servants, which
is irrelevant in cases where civil servants
have little direct knowledge of contractor
actions and performance in distant conflict
zones. Private contractors in Afghanistan
have thus, widely benefited from corruption
in the public procurement process. OSCE's
handbook first addresses the issue of bid
opening, evaluation and evaluation. US-
AID consistently awards prime contracts to
the same companies over and over again,
which as discussed under the previous sec-
tion reveals how the competing objectives
of government procurement result in incon-
sistent outcomes.
In September of 2004, the Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG) published a timely
analysis of the Iraq reconstruction process
and recommendations to be immediate-
ly implemented. They state: "Corruption
thrives on construction and public projects,
especially in the confusion and chaos of
transition."140 Citing lack of public capacity
to oversee contracting, expense and pro-
curement, the ICG stated that the U.S. is
"setting a bad example" of corruption for
the rebuilding Iraqi state.141 In particular,
they isolated three core problem areas:
1. The awarding of prime contracts to large
American firms behind closed doors with
corruption issues such as conflict of inter-
est, noncompetetive bids, poor procure-
ment procedures and over billing.
2. The "costs-plus" contract structure,
where "companies are fully reimbursed for
costs incurred and given an additional per-
centage as guaranteed profit."142
3. The prevalence of kickbacks to employ-
ees from subcontractors.
This 2004 assessment of corruption risks is
similar to the Jiron's 2003 USAID-OIG Mem-
orandum. At a very relatively early stage in
the respective reconstruction processes in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the problems had al-
ready been identified. Though OIG issued
the public administration vocabulary of "risk
assessment," the ICG employed the vocab-
ulary of corruption to condemn the same
phenomenon of private wartime contract-
ing.
The OSCE recommends that first
competitive bidding is only possible if the
bidders names are concealed from bid eval-
uators. Since this is rarely the case, they
also recommend that bid evaluation criteria
should be clearly outlined and bid selection
should be an open and transparent process.
Though US agencies have violated many of
these procurement norms in awarding re-
construction contracts, the OSCE implic-
itly authorizes such violations as necessary
exceptions: "In cases of extreme urgency
because of disasters" and "in cases where
national security is at risk." 143
There is also nothing inherently cor-
rupt about the "costs-plus" contract struc-
ture because financial abuses under such
contracts are legitimized first by contract,
and second, by common business practic-
es in tenuous conflict situations where un-
expected costs frequently arise. Kickbacks
in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken many
forms, but are frequently facilitation fees to
introduce a subcontractor to the prime for-
eign contractor. The problem with kickbacks
is that they are budgeted into primary budget
of the general contractor and only realized at
much lower levels. Though the USAID-OIG
has been able to uncover certain kickback
schemes and appropriately referred em-
ployees for prosecution, these schemes are
largely factored into what some employees
consider their rightful benefits package.
Furthermore, OSCE recommends
blacklisting of unethical contract partners. 14 4
This provision has also been institutional-
ized in the US with the Excluded Parties List
System. This Internet database allows bid
evaluators or businesses to identify individ-
uals and firms who have been debarred and
under suspension. Any database however,
is as good as its maintenance. Often due
to the use of aliases, reassignment with dif-
ferent firms and a general lack of oversight,
the database cannot accurately capture all
procurement code violators. Furthermore,
many known violators are very large private
development companies who generally tend
to avoid legal prosecution or are pardoned
due to their indispensable services.
Current USAID administrator Rajiv
Shah stated, "Too big to fail simply does not
exist in development." This statement is not
consistent with the fact that only one large
USAID NGO contractor-Academy for Edu-
cational Development-has been suspend-
ed so far. AED was suspended in December
2010 due to USAID-OIG's investigation into
the firm's "corporate misconduct, misman-
agement, and a lack of internal controls." 145
Though the agency was not debarred (per-
manently prohibited from getting new con-
tracts), a suspension for a giant government
contractor might as well be a ticket to bank-
ruptcy since the large percentage of their
revenue is contingent on contracts. After
only a few months of suspension, AED an-
nounced that it would sell of its assets so
that "most of AED's programs will continue
uninterrupted and most staff will continue to
implement activities grounded in our mis-
sion of implementing solutions to critical
social problems in the U.S. and around the
world."146
Suspensions and debarments are
some of USAID's most powerful sanctions
against contractors, and yet it is clear from
AED's case that an inefficient contractor
never really disappears. It only disassembles
into a m6lange of mergers and acquisitions,
to rise up from the ashes like a phoenix with
a new development brand to re-enter the
modern development enterprise.
Needless to say, such bureaucratic
best practices and accountability mecha-
nisms can be helpful, but remain inad-
equate for addressing the practice of cor-
ruption. Furthermore, the private sector in
this framing is placed on the supply-side of
corruption, and the public sector on the de-
mand-side, especially in the case of bribery.
In the case of private wartime contractors
however, an entrusted public official is en-
tering into a legally enforceable agreement
with a private company to provide services
or furnish goods. The anti-corruption frame
thus, is unable to directly tackle the issue
of private wartime contracting. In corruption
lingo, private contractors can commit fraud,
but only public officials can be truly defined
as "corrupt."
This distinction is especially troubling
in the case of USAID's investigation into
Edinburgh International mentioned earlier.
Though USAID-OIG concluded that Edin-
burgh International had not directly bribed
the Taliban or other insurgent groups, even if
they had, their activities would be contractu-
ally categorized as fraud and they could be
criminally prosecuted for funding terrorists.
Despite the fact that Edinburgh International
was entrusted to provide security (a public
good) for supplies critical to the US mission
and personnel (a public mission) in Afghani-
stan, the private contractor conveniently
falls outside the narrow scope of "entrusted
authority" that can be labeled corrupt.
If anti-corruption accountability mech-
anisms are to be effectively applied to con-
tractor states engaging in post-disaster
and post-conflict reconstruction, then they
must directly deal with the increasingly lev-
eled relationship between governments and
their contractors. If public officials continue
to shirk any accountability of contractor be-
havior and contractors continue to bemoan
lack of government oversight, then the re-
construction and development projects will
remain ripe for corruption.
Corruption has also become an explanatory
variable in understanding the challenges of
conflict and failures of peace building. Ex-
panding on the broader state building and
development-oriented works of Collier and
Ghani, anti-corruption scholars diagnose
the "conflict cycle" by positioning corrup-
tion at the intersection of development and
state-building challenges. Alix Boucher, Wil-
liam Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose
and Jason Terry took on the daunting chal-
lenge of mapping the relationship between
corruption and conflict, identifying five
"nodes or points of convergence on which
corruption fighters" can focus: 47
1) Post-conflict distribution of political and military
power.
2) Cross-border trafficking in people and commodi-
ties.
3) Informal post-war economy.
4) Weakened national public administration
5) Wasted, misspent, or mistargeted reconstruction
aid by international agencies and employees.
First, since it is very difficult to accurately
measure corruption, most corruption in-
dices such as TI's rely on popular or busi-
ness perceptions. Perceptions play a crucial
role in determining levels of trust both in
the government and the reconstruction ef-
fort. Second, Even when corruption is over-
stated in perception surveys, the legitimacy
of the governmental or international actor
relies on how closely they can link public
expectations with service delivery. Street
commentary on corruption thus, reveals
larger systemic issues in a given state and
as Daniel Jordan Smith says, it "has be-
come the dominant discourse of complaint
in the postcolonial world, symbolizing peo-
ple's disappointments with democracy and
development." 148
Current Anti-Corruption Reforms
Are Private Development Contractors on the
Anti-Corruption Agenda?
Corruption continues to be the pre-
ferred discourse of complaint to express
frustration with the shortcomings of secu-
rity and development promises. The lack of
oversight, institutions and appropriate le-
gal frameworks has been cited as the main
problem areas by military and development
agencies alike. After a decade of learning
from US contracting errors, General Petrae-
us recently stated that insufficient oversight
is the reason that international contracting
funds "unintentionally fuel corruption, fi-
nance insurgent organizations, strengthen
criminal patronage networks and undermine
our [US] efforts in Afghanistan."149 Some
of the Department of Defense (DoD) initia-
tives have been to (1) better train military
contracting officers that oversee contracts,
(2) begin using the Synchronized Predeploy-
ment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) elec-
tronic database to record contractor activi-
ties and (3) to enact the federal "contractor
transparency clause" 150 that would require
prime and first tier subcontractors to dis-
close information to the government. 151
The question is then, whether these
types of mechanisms actually increase con-
tractor accountability in conflict contexts?
Moreover, all of these initiatives are to tack-
le waste and fraud, and not other types of
contractor misconduct. Better training of
military or USAID contracting officers can
increase professional accountability, where-
by these officers can better monitor civilian
contractors. Using SPOT can also increase
bureaucratic accountability by helping the
State Department (DoS), DOD and USAID
share and track contractor activity and per-
formance. Using the contractor transparen-
cy clause can increase legal accountability,
because without adequate access to infor-
mation it is hard to legally prosecute cases
of fraud and abuse.
Even though General Petraeus is con-
cerned about the impact of contractor cor-
ruption in fueling the conflict, the account-
ability mechanisms do not seem tailored for
implementation in a conflict context. Legal,
bureaucratic and professional procedures
are implemented in an ad hoc fashion on the
ground. And even when fraud is revealed us-
ing these measures, the painfully slow pace
of litigation in civil fraud cases does not ad-
dress contractor accountability in a timely
fashion. A recent DoD report on contracting
fraud revealed that between 2007-2009, the
Pentagon had awarded $285 billion to con-
tractors convicted of fraud.1s2 These fraud
proceedings moreover only yielded $1 mil-
lion in court judgments. Robert E. Klitgaard,
Ronald MacLean-Abaroa and H. Lindsey
Parris devised a simple equation for under-
standing the frequency of corruption that
can perhaps help us evolve beyond blaming
corruption to improving accountability.153
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability
It is no surprise that in this equation, ac-
countability is understood as the only coun-
ter variable to an individual's monopoly on
decision-making and excessive discretion-
ary powers.
The Afghan government under pres-
sure from its own citizens and foreign aid
organizations has also stepped up to cre-
ate and continually revise anti-corruption
policies. This was initially done in compli-
ance with ratification of the UN Convention
against Corruption (UN-CAC). The Afghan
anti-corruption strategy, which combines
"Anti Corruption and Administrative Re-
form," outlines an entire section on con-
tracts with foreign companies and NGOs.
Main problem areas identified in the strat-
egy are inadequate legal expertise to evalu-
ate contract design, lack of pre-award con-
tractor evaluation, inaccurate project design
and nonexistent monitoring. The solutions
offered emphasize increased monitoring,
strengthening the contractor-licensing re-
gime and reforming existing procurement
laws.
Despite the existence of an anti-cor-
ruption strategy in Afghanistan, it remains
unclear how much jurisdiction the govern-
ment has over private development con-
tractors and subcontractors working for aid
agencies. Even with legal jurisdiction over all
private development and security contrac-
tors, it may not be feasible to quickly hold
contractors accountable without circuitous
judicial involvement. More to the point, the
sanctions (withholding contractor payment)
and incentives (extra payment for early proj-
ect delivery) written into a contract can only
be enforced by the donor agency or prime
contractor themselves.
The Afghanistan High Office of Over-
sight & Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) was set up
in July 2008 by the Karzai administration. An
Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) was also set up
in the Attorney General's office in late 2009.
This was followed by a joint venture between
ISAF and the Afghan government to estab-
lish the Combined Joint Interagency Task
Force (CJIATF)-Shafafiyat ("Transparency")
in August 2010. Though these Afghan an-
ti-corruption initiatives from 2008 onwards
are important steps for the Afghan state to
battle corruption ten years after the US-led
invasion, their primary focus is on counter-
ing corruption within government agencies,
targeting high level officials and preventing
the funneling of Afghan revenues and aid
funds into the hands of insurgents, warlords
and powerbrokers alike.
Private development contractors are
considered a nuisance, but they are not at
the top of the current anti-corruption agen-
da. Ultimately the job of keeping private
contractors in check belongs to the agen-
cies and governments that employ them.
Civil Society to the Rescue
(Ex: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, est. 2006)
Integrity Watch Afghanistan has a predomi-
nantly political accountability framing, be-
cause it is first and foremost concerned
with the project implementers, the state
and donors responding to beneficiary needs
and priorities. Post-conflict environment are
tenuous environments where most project
beneficiaries do not have direct access to
information about the projects (e.g. plans,
budgets, contractor information, project
targets). They do not have a forum to voice
grievances and demand sanctions with the
assurance they will be heard and addressed.
Despite the intermittent use of complaint
boxes and public consultation meetings,
in an insecure and volatile context, donors,
subcontractors and contractors are often
too afraid or prohibited from meeting with
beneficiaries without excessive security de-
tails. Large aid and development agency
employees such as USAID and UNDP thus,
tend to be barricaded in embassy and field
offices surrounded by security guards.
Within the anti-corruption discourse,
the primary role of contractor oversight is
left to the behest of civil society. The Afghan
anti-corruption strategy thus, places a pre-
mium on strengthening civil society so it can
hold government to account. IWA is only one
such civil-society actor, and has limited re-
sources to deal with larger systemic issues
of private sector corruption. Their strategy
to establish local monitoring groups does
provide an important check on contractor
corruption, though the approach is more
geared towards strengthening local gover-
nance by mobilizing local community and
political forces to hold project implementers
accountable. Without adequate leverage
however, it is difficult to make contractors
consistently answerable and enforceable to
local communities.
In February 2008, IWA began a pi-
lot project in Jabulsaraj, Parwan province,
which according to them receives the high-
est ratio of aid per capita in Afghanistan.
First, the local shura 54 is approached and
IWA employees propose the local monitor-
ing project to them. If the shura attendees
agree to participate, they are asked to se-
lect which of the ongoing community proj-
ects they would like to monitor based on
IWA's brief guidelines.155 Then, they present
the volunteer role and responsibilities of the
project monitor, who will be in charge of col-
lecting information on the project. Monitors
must determine the project objective, help
administer surveys to project beneficiaries,
identify the control systems of project im-
plementers and gather financial information
when possible.
Monitors are nominated, given an op-
portunity to explain their interest in the posi-
tion and eventually at least two are elected
by the shura. First, IWA trains the monitors
in both qualitative and quantitative meth-
odologies, including photo documentation
of projects. Monitors then begin to gather
project information through biweekly site
visits and gaining access to project contract
documents, bills, feasibility studies or evalu-
ations associated with the project.
Data collected based on monitor
assessments, beneficiary interviews and
questionnaires, project documents and any
contact with project implementers is relayed
to an IWA facilitator who helps compile the
information into a monitoring report. This
report is shared with community members,
donors, contractors and government offi-
cials. The report is a political accountabil-
ity mechanism that exerts pressure on local
government officials, donors and contrac-
tors to act and remedy project shortcom-
ings.
IWA has expanded to working in for-
ty-five communities, and are currently build-
ing towards one hundred and five. They have
effectively set up local monitoring groups for
dozens of projects, including the construc-
tion of a police station in Bagram District, a
road project in Darwaz-e-Kandahar, a water
project in Sajadiah and Paen Ab High School
in Herat city. The diversity of projects shows
that local monitoring groups are a sustain-
able monitoring institution that can cover a
wide range of development projects. Tech-
nical expertise can be a limitation, when
monitors may or may not be able to inspect
the quality of water engineering systems or
road construction materials. IWA however,
has recruited local engineering students to
provide technical expertise to communities
on an ad hoc basis.
The LMG program's strengths derive
from its emphasis on enabling communities
to hold donors and project implementers ac-
countable. By actually building capacity and
empowering local communities to measure,
document and present their grievances in a
monitoring framework familiar to NGOs and
aid agencies, IWA is able to translate street
level complaints about corruption into well-
informed, powerful political leverage. This
was the leverage that Abdul Mateen and his
colleagues used to confront the construc-
tion contractor in Chapter 1.
Human Rights Frame
The human rights discourse is large-
ly focused on Private Military and Security
Companies (PMSC). Even though as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, there is a
very strong relationship between the pri-
vate development and security industries,
the human rights discourse has largely ig-
nored the role of private development firms
in conflict areas. Since economic and social
rights, including the Right to Development
rarely make the headlines, the misappro-
priation and abuse of public funds for inter-
national development by private develop-
ment contractors is disturbing, but not a top
agenda item. Private development contrac-
tors are thus, relegated to the contentious
arena of congressional committee meetings
and lengthy, oversight agency reports. Jus
cogens human rights abuses remain the pri-
mary focus.
The Al Nisoor Square massacre can
be likened to the Challenger explosion in-
sofar as it roused the massive bureaucrat-
ic machinery of the United Nations, ICRC,
US Congress and others to action. The UN
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries,
a few months later, released a report citing
the incident as a prime case for expand-
ing the definition of mercenaries to include
PMSCs. 156 Overall, they recommend greater
international and national legislation regu-
lating the behavior of PMSCs and their em-
ployees. They also call for domestic licens-
ing regimes. 157
The Montreux Document, a collab-
orative effort between 2006-2008 by the
Swiss government and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) initially
brought together 17 governments, PMSCs,
international legal scholars and members of
the global human rights community to de-
fine the international legal obligations on
PMSCs and a list of best practices for states
to prevent human rights abuses. This docu-
ment was signed by the American, British,
Afghan and Iraqi government represen-
tatives. Though it sets an important legal
precedent, the Montreux Document is not
legally binding and only represents an inter-
national contracting standard states should
adhere to in conflicts.
These efforts are well-intentioned at-
tempts to increase legal and bureaucratic
accountability of private military and securi-
ty contractors who most believe fall through
gaps in international jurisdiction. The overly
legalistic human rights approach however,
does not adequately address the issue of
accountability in practice. Though licensing
and regulatory frameworks sanctioned un-
der international law seem like progressive
steps, they tend to silently legitimize the use
of private contractors without addressing
the practical issues of enforcing legal ac-
countability.
It seems that mainstream human
rights advocates and organizations forget
that contractors are utilized because of weak
governmental capacity and the slashing of
agency operational budgets. The account-
ability issues arise not because there is a
critical absence of regulation and laws, but
rather a critical lack of resources and per-
sonnel to enforce regulation. Jurisdictional
gaps are important to fill, but the state-cen-
tered human rights literature is relying on the
contractor state to license, regulate, moni-
tor and prosecute private contractors.
The existing regulatory bodies that
are a form of bureaucratic accountability
such as USAID-OIG, DoD-OIG, SIGAR and
SIGIR have done a tremendous job of un-
covering contractor fraud and abuse, de-
spite the fact that many of these offices are
run by a handful of investigators looking
into billions of dollars worth of contracts.
Yet, despite having many bureaucratic and
legal accountability mechanisms in place to
regulate PMSCs, public agencies like US-
AID in Afghanistan tend to circumvent their
responsibilities. For instance, they do not
directly contract PMSCs but require their
implementing partners to do so. Here is an
excerpt of a February 2007 USAID/Afghani-
stan contract with a partner:
Security for the Contractor's personnel and
offices is the responsibility of the Contrac-
tor. The Contractor shall assess the security
situation in Afghanistan and particularly in
the provinces targeted by the program, and
institute appropriate measures.158
By distancing themselves from PMSCs in
the above contract, USAID/Afghanistan is
trying to relinquish responsibility of any di-
rect oversight or liability due to the PMSC's
actions. Though a smart move by the agen-
cy, such distancing language is now in direct
violation of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for fiscal year 2008, section 862.159
This example shows that in response
to an incident like the Al-Nisoor Square
massacre, there is often intense pressure
for some sort of national and international
response. From a human rights perspec-
tive, this response takes the form of calling
for new legislation and increased regulation
and oversight. In practice however, when
strong human rights concerns translate into
bureaucratic and legal accountability mea-
sures, the original social and political poten-
cy of the concern becomes buried in report-
age.
Moreover, most international and na-
tional legal accountability mechanisms as-
sume that the state that is either hosting or
contracting the PMSC is ultimately respon-
sible for PMSC violations. Also, third-party
states like El Salvador, Chile, India and South
Africa where many contractors are recruit-
ed are told they should declare prosecute
and jurisdiction over nationals who conduct
human rights violations while abroad. Ac-
countability in these cases moves upward
to the highest possible form of authority-the
state.
None of these frameworks, surpris-
ingly enough, explicitly address who is ac-
countable when a UN development agency
or a private development company hires
PMSCs. As a multilateral organization, how
would for instance, UNDP be held account-
able if one of their private security con-
tractors killed a civilian? Do we treat the
UN agency as the highest unit of authority
who is liable for their contractors, and if so,
who will hold the agency accountable? The
same rationale applies to a private firm like
DAI who hired Edinburgh International. The
only recourse DAI would have in the even
that an Edinburgh employee committed a
human rights violation would be to investi-
gate and terminate the contract. They may
even withhold payment if that was accept-
able under the contract. It would be up to
the Afghan or American state to prosecute
the crime individually and determine what li-
ability, if any, Edinburgh International had for
the employee's actions.
The media and popular public dis-
course also seems to grudgingly accept the
reality of PMSCs. Following the Al Nisoor
square massacre, several popular non-
fiction books were published calling atten-
tion to dangers of using private security
contractors. Peter Warren Singer,160 David
Isenberg, 161 Jeremy Scahill, 162 Pratap Chat-
terjee163 and James Jay Carafano'6 are just
some of the prominent public voices that
have analyzed the issue and offered rec-
ommendations. Their opinions on private
contractors however, range broadly from
Scahill's absolute disapproval of the use
of contractors, Chatterjee's litany of com-
plaint's against the private American war
machine, Singer's cautionary tale from his
experiences in the Balkans, lsenberg's de-
fault call to increase legislation and Carafa-
no's wholehearted acceptance and promo-
tion of PMSCs.
Most of these public intellectuals ulti-
mately advocate for "increased accountabil-
ity" in the form of laws, which is emblematic
of the human rights approach. These are
generic calls to end the culture of impunity
for contractors killing civilians or torturing
prisoners. Many of them even recommend
pushing for international human rights con-
ventions to directly address the modern
form of private contractors. Romzek and
Dubnick would term this a push to increase
legal and bureaucratic accountability.
Rights-based legislation is critical for
building international consensus and set-
ting global norms, but it does not ensure
accountability of private contractors. Laws
also ensure the ability to hold to account.
But accountability also requires the "power
of information and participation."165 Fur-
thermore, the human rights accountability
frameworks have so far largely disregarded
economic and social rights abuses con-
ducted by private development firms. They
also have not addressed the growing hun-
ger of private development firms and multi-
lateral NGOs for private security, a truly un-
comfortable phenomenon for human rights
advocates. If we want to see an adequate
rights-based approach to private contractor
accountability, humanitarians must include
themselves as potential perpetrators of hu-
man rights abuses at the hands of hired
contractors.
Common Rights-Based
Accountability Recommendations
International and Domestic Laws Regulating PMSCs
Domestic and/or Global Licensing Regime of PMSCs
New Domestic and International Oversight Bodies
Increased Criminal Jurisdiction over PMSC Employees
International Register/Blacklist of Rights Violators
Current Human Rights Reforms
UN International Convention against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 4 December1989 [Entered into
Force 20 October 2001]
This is one of the older UN conven-
tions that address the topic of mercenaries,
but whose definition of "mercenary" does
not directly address the structure and recent
phenomena of PMSCs as used in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Though this convention explic-
itly prohibits the use of mercenaries, it is an
exceptionally weak convention with only 32
state parties and 10 signatories. The United
States, Great Britain, Iraq and Afghanistan
are not parties to this convention. Moreover,
it took twelve years for this convention to
enter into force, which incidentally occurred
a month after the events of September 11,
2001. In those twelve years, international
consensus has also shifted considerably
from this abolitionist perspective that seeks
to eliminate all contracting of military and
security functions. Despite its operational
weakness, this convention serves an im-
portant legitimating function for more recent
draft laws, conventions and documents on
PMSCs that cite the 1989 convention as an
international precedent for regulating PM-
SCs.
Additionally, there can be an overlap
between PMSCs and mercenarism in cer-
tain cases. For example, some PMSCs have
hired third-party nationals to work in Iraq or
Afghanistan, which would fall under the con-
vention's definition of "mercenary." In 2004,
a US PMSC Triple Canopy was reported to
be recruiting men and women from El Sal-
vador to go to Iraq. Geoff Thale from the
Washington Office of Latin America likened
this to a "poverty draft," which was targeting
and exploiting vulnerable El Salvadorans.166
It is also estimated that more than ten thou-
sand South African nationals, comprising
of former police and military personnel are
currently employed by PMSCs in Iraq.167
Though neither El Salvador, nor South Af-
rica is party to the 1989 convention, South
Africa did recently adopt "The Prohibition of
Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Cer-
tain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict"
law in 2006.168 The combined concern that
South African mercenaries were participat-
ing in coups across Africa and the rise in
South African nationals working for foreign
PMSCs in Iraq prompted the adoption of
this law. Even though the convention is cur-
rently unpopular, due to overlaps between
PMSC and mercenary activities, there are
still many institutions, activists and nations
pushing for wider adoption and ratification
the convention.
U.S. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
(MEJA) of 2000
Signed into law on 22 November
2000 at the end of the Bill Clinton's ad-
ministration, MEJA sought to cover two ju-
risdictional gaps. First, it sought to pros-
ecute former US military personnel who had
committed a crime during their service, but
due to their exit from the military could not
be prosecuted under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). Second, it allowed
prosecution of contractors employed by the
military, specifically those contracted by the
Department of Defense. 169
Since it preceded 9/11 and the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, this new legislation
quickly became outdated and inadequate
to address the large-scale contracting un-
dertaken by every US department, including
Department of State (DoS), USAID and De-
partment of Interior (Dol). 170
MEJA originally had been conceived to
address only a couple of discrete jurisdic-
tional gaps, not the broader issues of ac-
countability arising as a result of the whole-
sale reconfiguration and downsizing of the
armed forces, where security and many oth-
er kinds of contractors operate side-by-side
with uniformed troops.171
Though MEJA is inadequate to address the
current need for accountability in wartime
contingency contracting, it did set a prec-
edent of domestic extraterritorial jurisdiction
over certain subsets of military contractors.
It continues however, to be celebrated by
some in the U.S. government as a good ex-
ample of domestic oversight over contrac-
tors. This position thankfully, is not one of
consensus. Since the start of the two wars,
there have been continual efforts to reform
and expand MEJA, especially following the
17th September Al-Nisoor Square massa-
cre.
The MEJA Expansion and Enforce-
ment Act of 2007 was an attempt to "require
accountability for contractors and contract
personnel under Federal contracts, and for
other purposes." 172 In addition to providing
jurisdiction over all federal department con-
tractors, it also established jurisdiction over
all subcontractors no matter how far down
the contracting tier they fell. Though this Act
would have closed the jurisdictional gaps,
considering that until 2008 only twelve per-
sons were charged under MEJA with only a
few amounting to successful prosecutions,
the level of enforcement is contingent on
the allocation of resources to enforcement
agencies and open access to often confi-
dential and private wartime information.173
Even if enforcement needs, access
to information and unlimited jurisdiction was
provided, the Department of Justice would
be very careful in prosecuting contractors
because litigation draws negative attention
to the war effort and can further destabi-
lize the already precarious public opinion.
Despite these drawbacks, there continues
to be major pressure from human rights
groups, US politicians and the UN Working
Group on the Use of Mercenaries to expand
jurisdiction under MEJA.
Montreux Document (MD), September 17,
2008174
"On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and
Good Practices for States Related to Operations
of Private Military and Security Companies during
Armed Conflict."
The Montreux Document (MD) repre-
sents the first modern International attempt
to highlight the existing legal obligations of
both the "contracting state"175 that employs
the Private Military and Security Companies
(PMSC), 76 "territorial state"177 that hosts
them during armed conflict and the "home
state" 178 where the PMSC is based. Sev-
enteen original states, including the United
States, Great Britain, Iraq and Afghanistan,
came to an understanding after two years of
rigorous debate about their legal obligations
regarding PMSCs on September 17, 2008.
Today, that number has risen to thirty-five.
Using existing human rights agree-
ments, humanitarian law and customary in-
ternational law, the MD counters the claim
that the legal obligations of the contracting
state and its contractor PMSCs are in any
way unclear or vague. Even in the absence
of a discrete UN convention regulating PM-
SCs, there are "certain well-established rules
of international law [that] apply to states" to
prevent and prosecute human rights abuses
by PMSCs, including the provision of repa-
rations to wronged parties.17 9
Though this document is not a legal-
ly binding international agreement, several
states, including the United States of Ameri-
ca have participated in the process of creat-
ing the MD and endorsed the final product.
The process of formulating the MD, which
was hosted by the Government of Switzer-
land, also included participation from PM-
SCs and civil society actors. It thus, has the
capacity to exercise the same type of influ-
ence as a treaty, and may even serve as a
precursor to a UN Convention on PMSCs.
The MD holds that the contracting
state instructs the conduct of the PMSC
hence, is responsible for their actions,
which raises the question about what hap-
pens when a PMSC subcontracts to anoth-
er PMSC. The MD however, cleverly defines
contracting states as those who "directly
contract for the services of PMSCs, includ-
ing, as appropriate, where such a PMSC
subcontracts with another PMSC." In this
way, they establish that the chain of ac-
countability moves upwards from the lowest
possible subcontractor towards the highest
responsible party-the contracting state.
Though this may seem like a minor
detail, in the case of complicated contract-
ing and sub-contracting relationships be-
tween private actors, the establishment of
the state as the responsible party in typical
human rights tradition mandates more regu-
lation of private actors. "Superior respon-
sibility" is also attributed to governmental
officials (military and civilian) and directors
or managers of PMSCs. In the MD, supe-
rior responsibility is "not engaged solely
by virtue of a contract." 180 This means that
military, civilian and business leaders can
be held liable for crimes under international
law. The chain of accountability yet again
moves upwards from the lowest PMSC em-
ployee to the highest responsible individual.
The responsibilities of the territo-
rial state and the home state of the PMSC
are largely defined in legislative terms, in
the legalistic spirit of human rights, where
the state must provide adequate recourse
against misconduct of PMSCs and their
personnel. These legal obligations include
enacting legislation, investigation, prosecu-
tion, administration of fair trials, and extradi-
tion of suspects when necessary.
In addition to highlighting existing le-
gal obligations of states mentioned above,
the MD also highlights non-legally binding
"good practices" related to PMSCs. These
include protocols for defining services, se-
lecting contractors, their training, raising
awareness of all applicable human rights
laws, regular reporting and ensuring welfare
of employees. The MD also recommends
provision of civil liability, criminal jurisdiction
and/or establishing national corporate crim-
inal responsibility regarding crimes commit-
ted by PMSCs under international law.
Draft of a Possible Convention on Private
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)
for Consideration and Action by the Human
Rights Council (2010)181
In the 2010 Working Group on the
Use of Mercenaries report, they include a
copy of the most recent attempt at a draft
convention on PMSCs. This convention
largely builds on the framework used in the
MD, using identical terms like "contracting
states," "states of operation," and "home
states." It too outlines the specific respon-
sibilities of the different types of state par-
ties in their relations to the PMSC. It also
attempts to define "inherently state func-
tions"-those that cannot be outsourced.
The definition remains vague and includes
many currently outsourced functions, like
intelligence, knowledge transfer with mili-
tary, security and policing application, and
the interrogation of detainees.
Some notable features that distin-
guish this draft from the aforementioned is
the provision of both an international regis-
try and domestic state registries that keep
track of all licensed PMSCs in the world and
their contract records. In addition to the in-
ternational PMSC database, the convention
sets up an "International Fund for the Reha-
bilitation of Victims" in Article 28.182 Article
37 also sets up an optional mechanism for
Individual and Group petitions.
The draft was circulated widely and
was open to comments from various stake-
holders between July and September 2009.
Some of the interesting criticisms it
received was
1) The convention should cover situations beyond
armed conflict, since PMSCs are utilized in non-conflict
settings as well, also in disaster relief operations,
2) The need to establish international standards for
domestic licensing regime to ensure some basic stan-
dards,
3) Others wanted an international licensing regime in
lieu of various domestic ones,
4) The special fund for victims required further clarifi-
cation as to the definition of "victim," compensation
amounts and clarifying the relation between State and
PMSC obligations to compensate victims,
5) High implementation costs of a domestic regulatory
regime could be a disincentive to ratification,
6) "Inherently governmental functions" remains a vague
term,
7) Individual right to petition should not be optional and
8) There needs to be further specification on how to
balance transparency with the PMSC industry's desire
for privacy. 83
International Code of Conduct (ICoC) for
Private Security Service Providers (27 Au-
gust 2010, Swiss Initiative)*"
The ICoC emerged out of a Swiss-ini-
tiated yearlong collaboration between PSC
industry associations, corporations, busi-
ness leaders and the US and UK govern-
ments. It thus, builds on both the Montreux
Document (also hosted by the Swiss gov-
ernment) and the United Nations "Respect,
Protect, Remedy" framework developed by
John Ruggie, Special Representative of the
UN Secretary General on Business and
Human Rights. It, moreover, requires its
signatories to endorse the principle of the
aforementioned texts.
The ICoC, a non-legally binding
document, largely echoes the rights-based
framework outlined by the Montreux Docu-
ment by emphasizing the need to follow in-
ternational humanitarian and human rights
laws. It specifies personnel conduct for use
of deadly and non-lethal force, the appre-
hension and detention of people, the prohi-
bition against torture, discrimination, sexual
or gender-based violence, human traffick-
ing, slavery and the worst forms of child
labor. Where the ICoC distinguishes itself
is in its positive duty towards civilian rights
in states of operation: The right to privacy,
property, freedom of expression, freedom of
peaceful assembly, freedom of association
and creating a duty to ensure the "identi-
fication of personnel." All of these special
considerations are directed towards civil-
ians in states where PSCs operate and are
a response to the criticisms that PSCs may
provide security to their clients, but largely
create insecurity for civilian populations.
The last requirement for personnel to
identify themselves is extremely important.
In the case of Afghanistan, for instance,
where the majority of PSC employees tend
to be local Afghans, PSCs often recruit for-
mer militia members since they already have
weapons. 185 -186 As such, they may maintain
ties with their former patrons, e.g. tribal
leaders, warlords, which leads to distrust
of PSC employees among Afghan civilians
and increases the chances that former mi-
litia members will commit human rights
violations. Without adequate identification
such as ID badges, uniforms or the use of
marked cars however, it is exceedingly dif-
ficult to monitor the activities of PSC em-
ployees and hold them accountable. Thus,
it makes it impossible for an Afghan civilian
to distinguish between men employed by
warlords versus a PSC employee, because
often they are the same individual who has
simply changed patrons.
Since the ICoC is a document tar-
geted towards PSC industry professionals,
it designs special commitments regarding
company contract, management and gover-
nance policies. For instance, in the pream-
ble, it states "whenever possible, compli-
ance with this Code will be made an integral
part of contractual agreements, including
those with clients, personnel, companies
and subcontractors." 187 Though the pream-
ble uses "whenever possible" to leave the
door open for non-compliance, later in the
document in a section entitled "Selection
and Vetting of Subcontractors," the ICoC
mandates that "signatory companies will
only enter into sub-contracting agreements
with companies or individuals who accept
the commitments contained in this code
[my emphasis]." 1"
Personnel contracts must also incor-
porate the code and be available in a lan-
guage accessible for personnel, which is
helpful for third-party nationals from coun-
tries like India, El Salvador and South Afri-
ca. They are also required to keep service
and employment records that can assist law
enforcement officials in future litigation and
provide a basis for disciplinary action or dis-
missal within the company.
Other internal mechanisms to regu-
late personnel conduct is the requirement to
authorize all service weapons, mandate in-
cident reporting, provide a safe and healthy
working environment and prevent employee
harassment. Furthermore, the code sets up
internal grievance and disciplinary proce-
dures for any violations under the code or
human rights law. It also creates a whis-
tleblower policy to protect employees who
report. And finally, it specifies the estab-
lishment of a fund or adequate insurance
coverage to meet any type of liability. An
independent and oversight body will further
monitor this code. The form of this body
has not been determined as of yet.
Given the rigorous and invasive reg-
ulatory nature of this code, it is surprising
that as of April 2011, ninety-four major in-
ternational PSCs including AEGIS, DynCo-
rp, Garda World, Edinburgh International,
Xe Services (formerly Blackwater) and Four
Horsemen International have all signed the
code. Seven PSC industry associations,
including the Private Security Association
of Iraq (PSCAI), also endorsed the code.
Though the industry's show of good faith
in its eagerness to adopt self-regulatory
mechanisms is admirable, there is another
motivation.
As the governments of Afghanistan
and Iraq have moved towards regulating
and/or banning PSCs, along with several
international convention projects on PM-
SCs, the industry does not want to be mar-
ginalized and uninvited to the negotiation
table. By taking a proactive rights-based
approach, they have ensured that they have
a legitimate voice in not only shaping any
international or domestic legislation on PM-
SCs, but also to ensure they can shift equal
responsibility on state and humanitarian
partners who given the political tidings may
seek to use them as scapegoats for irre-
sponsible PMSC behavior in the field.
In addition to the ICoC, internation-
al PSCs operating in Iraq and Afghanistan
have formed country-based associations,
such as the Private Security Association
of Iraq (PSCAI) mentioned above and the
Private Security Association of Afghani-
stan (PSCAA), which is modeled after the
PSCAL. These associations are yet another
mechanism for developing shared industry
norms and operational standards through
the development of an association consti-
tution and engagement with the local gov-
ernments. While on the one hand these
associations can be understood as another
private sector self-regulating mechanism,
on the other hand, they largely function as
foreign PSC "interest groups," who are able
to influence domestic regulatory legislation
in Iraq and Afghanistan and build trust with
local ministries, such as the Ministry of Inte-
rior that are in charge of licensing.189
The ICoC is a critical tool to integrate
human rights into corporate norms. It re-
mains however, largely insufficient because
it relies on voluntary membership and lacks
sufficient oversight mechanisms. Associa-
tion charters and codes of conduct such as
the ones for the ICoC, PSCAI and BAPSC
have largely attracted major international
corporations. Small, locally based PSCs,
who are often also subcontractors, are ei-
ther uninvited to join associations like the
PSCAI or may simply lack the capacity or
will to join and implement such mecha-
nisms. This is another structural barrier to
the greatest possible impact of such indus-
try self-regulating mechanisms. The ICoC
thus, requires the support of domestic and
international legislation to increase its legiti-
macy and impact in the field.
International Peace Operations Association
(IPOA) Code of Conductl90
The International Stability Opera-
tions Association, also known as IPOA, is
a trade association based in Washington,
D.C. for various private security, military and
development contractors. The private sec-
tor's response to regulatory frameworks is
of course to first, self-regulate. Though the
IPOA's code of conduct is in many ways a
commendable private sector effort to in-
crease self-regulation of wartime contract-
ing, it is important to note that out of the top
fifty Private Contractors in Iraq and Afghani-
stan between 2003 and 2006, only four are
currently members of the IPOA.191 The top
contractor Kellogg Brown and Root (former-
ly Halliburton) is not an IPOA member, but
the second largest DynCorp International is
in fact a member. After that the 16th, 22nd,
and 44th largest contractors are members.
The I POA website states:
ISOA is committed to raising the standards
of the peace and stability operations in-
dustry to ensure sound and ethical profes-
sionalism and transparency in the conduct
of peacekeeping and post-conflict recon-
struction activities.92
The IPOA specifically obliges all of
its members to be "guided" by the following
human rights conventions and documents:
i Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
E Geneva Conventions (1949)
7 Convention Against Torture (1975)
] Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions
(1977)
E Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)
7 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(2000)
n Montreux Document on Private Military and Security
Companies (2008)
The ideals of human rights, transparency,
accountability, legitimate client selection
and employee safety are the core principles
of the code of conduct. With regards to
transparency, the IPOA assures a full level of
compliance with all legal obligations to co-
operate and share information. However, in
the absence of a domestic legal regime that
ensures access to information and jurisdic-
tion, IPOA members are not obliged to go
beyond their legal obligations.
The IPOA code of conduct attempts
to distance itself from mercenary-type ac-
tivities by assuring adequate training of per-
sonnel, background checks and attempt not
to use third-party nationals, rather recruit pri-
marily from the local population. They agree
to adhere to ILO age-minimum standard of
15-years, which still provides an opening for
the recruitment of child soldiers. Recently
some PMSC employees have articulated
their rights under the UN Trafficking Proto-
col, which deems a person trafficked when
he/she cannot return at the termination of
their contract. The IPOA states that it will
not detain employees beyond their contrac-
tual obligation. Furthermore, in response to
charges of human rights violations of PMSC
employees, who are frequently denied prop-
er medical care and insurance, the IPOA en-
sures the provision of appropriate protective
gear and care. Rules of engagement under
the code of conduct must comply with in-
ternational humanitarian law. This code also
requires a pledge from members not to use
excessive weapons or partake in arms traf-
ficking. This echoes the International Draft
Convention on Regulating Private Military
and Security Companies mentioned above.
The truly remarkable portion of this
code is provision ten, which outlines mem-
bers' responsibilities with regards to sub-
contracting parties. The code explains,
"due to the complex nature of the conflict/
post-conflict environments, companies of-
ten employ the services of partner compa-
nies and subcontractors to fulfill the duties
of their contract." So, the code establishes
a chain of accountability from the lowest
subcontractor to the highest-level member
company:
Signatories agree that they select partner
companies and subcontractors with the
utmost care and due diligence to ensure
that they comply with all appropriate ethi-
cal standards, such as this Code of Con-
duct.19 3
The complex, multi-layered, transnational
contracting and subcontracting practices
render it almost impossible to firmly estab-
lish the correct chain of accountability that
contributes to an appearance of a culture
of impunity around PMSCs. Though this is
only a code of conduct, the fact that it sug-
gests the private contractor is accountable
for ensuring its subcontractors uphold the
same level of ethics is a step towards inter-
nalizing human rights as corporate norms.
The IPOA also has a fairly detailed
enforcement mechanism that is twice as
long as the code of conduct. Moreover,
they have a complaint mechanism where
individuals can lodge complaints in writing
or on their website against companies. This
is a fairly progressive step to promote ac-
countability. The process from the lodging
of a complaint to action from the Standards
Committee of the International Peace Op-
erations Association (SCIPOA) can take up
to 3-4 months according to their internal
protocols. Though their commitment to in-
vestigate complaints is admirable, it seems
the heaviest sanctioning tool they have is
the member's expulsion from the IPOA. This
may or may not be a strong enough sanction
to prevent violations of the code though, ex-
pulsion may have negative spillover effects
for the member firm, such as detrimental ef-
fects to its reputation, industry relationships
and invites to industry conferences.
The IPOA also testified in front of the
CWC on September 14, 2009.194 Represent-
ing over sixty companies, the IPOA was
able to present industry concerns to the
commission and made the following recom-
mendations:
1) Create a separate unit of Contingency Contract Of-
ficers to improve relations and oversight between mili-
tary and PMSCs.
2) Adapt procurement and contract management rules
to contingency environment. Remove unnecessary
bureaucratic delays.
3) Contracting officers, contracting officer representa-
tives, industry executives and country managers should
work together as partners, not as antagonists.
4) Use the Department of Defense's bidding structure,
where they are not legally obliged to go with the lowest
bidder, as is the case for the State Department. There
should be a true-best value competition.
5) Mandatory third-party certification of PSCs.
6) Industry self-regulation is a positive step, but con-
tract law, criminal laws and government oversight must
provide better accountability mechanisms.
In addition to these recommendations, the
IPOA reminded congress that contractors
also work in humanitarian and international
peacekeeping missions, for instance Haiti,
Darfur and Eastern Congo.
By highlighting the significant and
growing presence of PSCs in low-intensity
conflicts, peacekeeping missions and di-
saster relief operations, they are seeking
to expand regulatory frameworks to go be-
yond situations of armed conflict. This can
be understood as the industry's attempt to
further legitimize and institutionalize itself
as an integral and permanent portion of US
defense, diplomacy and development op-
erations abroad. This institutionalization can
only be achieved by the Industry's willing
submission to a regulatory framework.
CHAPTER 4 CITATIONS
105 Richard Mulgan. "'Accountability': An Ever-Expanding Concept?" Public Administration. Vol. 78 No.3,
2000, 555
106 ibid, 557
107 Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick, "Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Chal-
lenger Tragedy." Public Administration Review. Vol. 47, No. 3, 227-238
108 ibid, 228
109 Development Alternatives, Inc. "Alternative Livelihoods Program Eastern Region (ALP-ER)." Quarterly
Report-Second Quarter 2005. 30 July 2005, 22. This project was in collaboration with Bearing Point, Hatch Mott
MacDonald, Social Impact and Relief International.
110 Romzek and Dubnick, 229
111 For more information, see epls.gov
112 Romzek and Dubnick, 229
113 ibid.
114 ibid, 232
115 ibid.
116 ibid.
117 Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Final Report, Volume 1, 26 August 2003. Accessed: http://caib.
nasa.gov/default.html
118 Nake M. Kamrany, "Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan: American and Soviet Models for Economic Aid."
Washington, DC: Communication Service Corporation, 1969
119 Steven L. Schooner, "Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law." Public Law and
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 37. The George Washington University Law School, 2002. Accessed: http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=304620, 2
120 Title 48 - Federal Acquisitions Regulations Systems, 3.101-1 "Improper Business Practices and Personal
Conflicts of Interest."
121 Steven L. Schooner, "Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law." Public Law and
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 37. The George Washington University Law School, 2002. Accessed: http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=304620
122 "The extremely short time for construction and limited maintenance budgets required Berger to develop
long-lasting paving materials. In response, the Team designed an asphalt treated base using screened river run
gravel treated with Chemcrete." For this road reconstruction project, LBG subcontracted road sections to Arc
Construction (Turkey), Mensel Construction (Turkey), Kolin Natfer Construction (Turkey), BSC & C&C Construc-
tion (India) and Gulsan/Cukorova Construction (Turkey). www.louisberger.com/berger/world/2003q4/mainpage.
html (Accessed 2004)
123 Lorenzo Deslegues, "Integrity in Reconstruction-Afghan Roads Reconstruction: Deconstruction of a Lucra-
tive Assistance." Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 2007, 4-5
124 Colonel Dan Anninos (Chief of Staff, USACE), "Reconstruction in Iraq: The Challenges, the Wins, and the
Losses." Security Studies Program Special Seminar at MIT. 14 April 2011.
125 Two seminars are recently scheduled by DAI between May 8-12, 2011. "Essential Knowledge to Adminis-
ter USAID Awards." Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. http://www.acbar.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=57:essential-knowledge-to-ad minister-usaid-awards&catid=3:notice-board
126 27 April 2011 interview with Afghan engineer who had worked on a USAID-funded project for IOM and one
for Emerging Markets Group, Ltd.
127 "Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Construction of Health and Education Facilities Program." USAID-OIG.
Audit Report No. F-306-11-002-P 27 March 2011.
128 "Memorandum: Review of Security Costs Charged to USAID Projects in Afghanistan." USAID-OIG. Review
Report No. 5-306-10-002-S. 29 September 2010, 7
129 ibid.
130 C.M. Sennott, "Taxpayer Money Funneled to Taliban." GlobalPost.com. 30 September 2010. www.global-
post.com/print/5589160 (Accessed 27 November 2010)
131 "Memorandum: Review of Security Costs Charged to USAID Projects in Afghanistan." USAID-OIG. Review
Report No. 5-306-10-002-S. 29 September 2010, 6
CHAPTER 4 CITATIONS contd
132 BG Peter A. DeLuca, "Engineers in Service to the Nation." MIT, Center for International Studies Lecture. 28
April 2011
133 This was corroborated in conversations with an aid worker who had worked in Afghanistan for three years
and by USACE and US Army personnel.
134 Cited by Naomi Klein, The Nation, 5 January 2004, In "Reconstructing Iraq," International Crisis Group.
2 September 2004. http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%2OAfrica/iraq%20
Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/Reconstructing%20lraq.ashx (Accessed: 20 February 2011)
135 Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church and Kirby Reiling Eds, "Pilfering the Peace, Lilies that Fester: Seeds of Cor-
ruption and Peacebuilding," New Routes by Life & Peace Institute, Available at: http://www.life-peace.org/sajt/
filer/pdf/NewRoutes/NR93_4.pdf
136 ibid.
137 "Frequently Asked Questions about Corruption," Transparency International. www.transparency.org/
policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi/201 0/faqs (Accessed: 3 January 2011). TI's renowned Corruption Percep-
tions Index is slowly becoming a global standard for rating corruption by industry and country. Not without its
methodological issues, TI's corruption index is still a very powerful advocacy tool for anti-corruption practitio-
ners pushing for legislation, regulation and oversight.
138 Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis." The American Political
Science Review. Vol. 61, No. 2, 419
139 "OSCE 2004 Best Practices in Combating Corruption." Office of the Coordinator for Economic and Envi-
ronmental Activities, Vienna. www.osce.org/item/13568.html (Accessed 11 January 2011), 61
140 "Reconstructing Iraq," 21
141 ibid, 22
142 ibid.
143 OSCE Handbook, 105
144 OSCE, 112
145 "USAID Suspends Academy for Educational Development from Receiving New U.S. Government Awards."
Press Release. USAID. 8 December 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/201 0/pr1 01 208.html (Accessed
19 February 2011)
146 Edward W. 'Peter' Russell (Statement from the Chairman of the Board to AED Staff), "AED to Seek Orderly
Acquisition and Transfer of its Programs and Assets; 50-year-old NGO Map Positive Way Forward for Projects
and Staff." AED.org. http://www.aed.org/News/AED-to-Seek-Orderly-Acquisition-and-Transfer-of-its-Programs-
and-Assets.cfm
147 Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose and Jason Terry, "Mapping and Fighting
Corruption in War-Torn States." Stimson Centre Report No. 61. 1 March 2007. http://sel.isn.ch/serviceengine/
Files/ISN/93692/ipublicationdocumentsingledocument/6267EED2-AF4E-47CF-BA3D-ACAB47BDCC82/en/
Report6l.pdf (Accessed: 9 January 2011)
148 Daniel Jordan Smith, "The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria," in Robert 1. Rot-
berg, Ed. Corruption, Global Security and World Order. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2009, 286
149 Deb Riechmann, "Gen. David Petraeus Issues Afghan Contracting Guidance." The Associated Press. 13
September 2010. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39133494/ns/worldnews-southandcentral-asia/ (Accessed
21 February 2011)
150 The contractor transparency clause is part of the US Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act
of 2006
151 FAR 52.204-10 Published July 8, 2010.
152 "Report to Congress on Contracting Fraud." Department of Defense. January 2011 accessed through
"Release: Pentagon Spent Billions on Contractors that Committed Fraud." Bernie Sanders: US Senator for Ver-
mont. Sanders.senate.gov 2 February 2011. http://sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=2B80052E-9401 -
4B96-989C-84D506B76DEB (Accessed 21 February 2011)
153 Robert E. Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean-Abaroa and H. Lindsey Parris, Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to
Cure and Prevention. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2000, 31
154 A local town meeting between elders to discuss community issues
155 Thanks to the co-Director of IWA, Lorenzo Deslegues for providing me with critical materials for this case
CHAPTER 4 CITATIONS contd
study on the organizations local monitoring projects. "Monitoring Aid from the Ground Up." Powerpoint Presen-
tation for TIRI: Making Integrity Work.
156 UN A/HRC/7/7 "Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination." 9 January 2008 http://www.
unwg.rapn.ru/en/4/Annual%20Reports/2_G0810075.pdf (Accessed 4 December 2010), 18
157 ibid, 25-7
158 "Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan." USAID-OIG. 21
May 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy1 Orpts/5-306-10-009-p.pdf (Accessed 7 December 2010), 11-12
159 H.R. 158. "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008" 110th Congress 2007-2008. Subtitle
F, section 862: "Requires the: (1) Secretary to prescribe regulations on the selection, training, equipping, and
conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a federal contract or subcontract in an area of
combat operations; and (2) Federal Acquisition Regulation to be revised to require the insertion into each cov-
ered contract or subcontract of a clause addressing such selection, training, equipping, and conduct. Requires
a report from the DOD Inspector General to Congress on the feasibility and advisability of a pilot program for
the imposition of fines on contractors or subcontractors for personnel who violate or fail to comply with such
regulations or requirements. Makes requirements of this section inapplicable to contracts entered into by ele-
ments of the intelligence community in support of intelligence activities."
160 Peter Warren Singer. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University
Press, 2008
161 David Isenberg. Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq. Westport: Praeger Security Interna-
tional, 2009
162 Jeremy Scahill. Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army. Nation Books, 2008
163 Pratap Chatterjee. Halliburton's Army: How a Well-connected Texas Oil Company Revolutionized the Way
America Makes War. Nation Books, 2009
164 James Jay Carafano. Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Conflict - Afghanistan, Iraq and Future
Conflicts. Praeger Security International, 2008
165 Davis, 3
166 Kevin Sullivan, "Poor Salvadorans Chase the 'Iraqi Dream'." WashingtonTimes.com. 9 December 2004
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49592-2004Dec8.htm (Accessed 8 December 2010)
167 Paul Salopek "Casualties of South Africa's Silent War in Iraq - Desperation Drives Kin of Four Abducted
Mercenaries to Speak Out. An Exodus of Highly Paid Guns Alarms, Embarrasses Pretoria," L.A. Times October
14, 2007. http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/l 4/news/adfg-mercenary14 (Accessed 8 December 2010)
168 "MPs Approve New Mercenary Bill," BBCnews.com 30 August 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afri-
ca/5297704.stm (8 December 2010)
169 This analysis of MEJA can be found in "Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impu-
nity." Human Rights First. 2008 http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-final.pdf (Accessed 4
December 2010), 25
170 ibid.
171 ibid.
172 "MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2001," H.R. 2740. 110th Congress, 1st Session. October 4,
2007
173 Jennifer K. Elsea, "Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues." Congressional Re-
search Service. 7 January 2010, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf (Accessed 8 December 2010), 23
174 "The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices
for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed
Conflict." ICRC
175 The Montreux Document defines "contracting states" as those "that directly contract for the services of
PMSCs, including, as appropriate, where such a PMSC subcontracts with another
PMSC," 9
176 The Montreux Document defines PMSCs as "private business entities that provide military and/or security
services irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular,
CHAPTER 4 CITATIONS contd
armed guarding and protection of personas and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; main-
tenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and
security personnel," 9
177 The Montreux Document defines "territorial states" as those "on whose territory PMSCs operate," 10
178 The Montreux Document defines "home states" as the "States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC
is registered or incorporated; if the State where the PMSC is incorporated is not the one where it has its princi-
pal place of management, then the State where the PMSC has its principal place of management is the 'Home
State'," 10
179 Montreux Document, 9
180 ibid, 15
181 "Draft of a Possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) for Consideration and
Action by the Human Rights Council" found in "Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination." 2
July 2010 (Accessed 4 December, 2010), 25
182 ibid, 39
183 ibid, 17-19
184 "International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers." ICOC-PSP.org. 27 August 2010.
185 Lisa Rimli & Dr. Susanne Schmeidl, "Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory
Study of Afghanistan and Angola." Swiss Peace. November 2007. www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_
upload/pdf/PSC.pdf (Accessed 8 December 2010)
186 "The hiring of militia members *by PSCs+ virtually en masse, with their estimated 44,000 weapons, is
described as 'expedient' despite government efforts to disarm the various nonstate armed organizations in
Afghanistan." Christopher Spearin, "What Manley Missed: The Human Security Implications of Private Security
in Afghanistan" in Security Privatization: Challenges and Opportunities Human Security Bulletin [Vol 6, Issue 3,
March 2008], 8-11
187 ICoC, 6
188 ibid, 11
189 Rimli & Schmeidl, 27
190 The ISOA/IPOA has 52 current members. Some of the most notable members include DynCorp, AECOM
Technology and Triple Canopy.
191 Bill Buzenberg, "Baghdad Bonanza: The Top 100 Private Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan." The Center
for Public Integrity. http://projects.publicintegrity.org/WOWII/default.aspx
192 "Code of Conduct," International Stability Operations Association. http://ipoaworld.org/eng/
codeofconduct/87-codecodeofconductv1 2enghtml.html (Accessed 4 December 2010)
193 ibid.
194 "IPOA Testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting." International Stability Operations As-
sociation. 14 September 2009. http://ipoaworld.org/eng/press/127-20090914ipoatestimonycwc.html (Accessed
11 December 2010)
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
As Austen Davis states, "for accountability to work, there has to be the power to
hold to account; there has to be the power of information and participation; and there has
to be the power to judge and enforce judgment." These recommendations specifically
address private development contractors. Some recommendations are broader that ad-
dress domestic US agency operations, while others emphasize ways to empower benefi-
ciaries to hold development contractors accountable through transparency - the power of
information, networks - the power of participation and remedy - the power to judge and
enforce judgment.
1. Private Development contractors and subcontractors who receive government
funds must make public their contract documents: operational and project budgets,
all project costs incurred (e.g. materials, human resources, transport) and project
documents (e.g. blueprints, indicators, monitoring and evaluation metrics).
a. Civilians, civil society organizations and local government leaders should be legally and contractually
empowered to access this information at any time.
b.This could also be modeled after the Indian Right to Information act, whereby contractors have to
provide the information within for example, 7 business days or else face criminal prosecution, fines or
the termination of their contract.
2. Ensure beneficiaries, civil society organizations and local government officials
have access to American databases, such as the Excluded Parties List System
(EPLS).
a. The existing database is not as dynamic as it can be. If beneficiaries and civil society organizations
could write contractor reviews and report fraudulent contractors, government agencies can use this
"customer satisfaction" rating to discourage or encourage the use of a particular contracting firm or
individual. (Since lack of Internet access and English-language skills can be two major barriers, civil so-
ciety and humanitarian groups can act as an intermediary to upload the information to the web where
project funders and the contracting agency could view it).
b.Create a Dari and Pashto equipped site to record information for contractors working in Afghanistan.
3. Fund the creation of country-specific project monitoring and evaluation website.
a. Since there are a plethora of monitoring and evaluation actors (private contractors, independent
observers, local government officials, civil society organizations and local monitoring groups), it would
be helpful to upload all monitoring and evaluation reports to a centralized website so that donors and
beneficiaries can share information.
b. Though USAID administrator stated that monitoring reports would become available for the public
to peruse after 30 days, it would be helpful to compare USAID-commissioned monitoring and evalua-
tion reports with reports from other sources.
c. This portal could also provide space for individuals to contest the monitoring and evaluation reports.
4. Include local monitoring and social audits as components of project and contract
design.
a. Just as budget, monitoring and evaluation information flows upwards to donors, it must flow down-
wards to beneficiaries. Local monitoring and social audits are processes whereby beneficiaries have
some access to donor and contractor networks. These processes that are generally used in small-scale
projects.
------ i. Despite often-low levels of expertise to monitor for effectiveness, local community groups have
far greater stake in the success of the project. If there is no community stake, then the presence of the
project should be questioned in the first place.
-------- ii. Add contractual clauses that mandate local construction contractors, especially those building
schools, clinics, wells, etc. engage in social audit workshops through civil society facilitators with the
community they serve. This will set up an accountability relationship between contractors implementing
development projects and the beneficiaries they serve.
-------- iii. Develop or use simple tests for construction materials that can be quickly taught to project
beneficiaries and local staff. Since "lack of local capacity" is frequently cited as a hindrance to quality
monitoring, technical structural engineering monitoring that is less frequent can be supplemented by
more frequent, low-tech monitoring of construction materials that can be easily switched out in the
week-long gap between monitoring visits.
b. Local monitoring reports should be factored in as project "indicators" to determine quality of contrac-
tor performance and as a basis for levying fines or granting monetary incentives.
5. Increase the operational budget for USAID, while decreasing their budget alloca-
tions and projects.
a. USAID desperately needs an influx of full-time personnel to conduct adequate monitoring and evalu-
ation of their development projects.
b. Stop contracting out monitoring and evaluation. USAID should build in-house capacity to conduct
monitoring and evaluation. The reliance on contractors for M/E results in the generation of many reports
that may not even be read by USAID personnel and/or impact the ongoing development project. Con-
tracting monitoring and evaluation further distances USAID from the projects it is implementing.
c. USAID is not structured for conduction reconstruction in a time-compressed situation amidst conflict.
Either the agency must be restructured or discontinued from conducting reconstruction in conflict con-
texts.
6. Determine a fixed cap on tiers of subcontracting.
a. Though USAID has expressed a desire to restrict the levels to the number of contractors deemed of
value, it is important to set a definite limit, such as 2 or 3. Despite USAID's desire to allow for some flex-
ibility in tiers of subcontracting, without a fixed limit, subcontracting will continue ad infinitum. The limit
should be determined by USAID's personnel capacity to keep track of the 2nd and 3rd tier subcontrac-
tors.
b. Prohibit the extraction of administrative costs when contracts move between two agencies in the
same organizations, such as when contracts are awarded to UNDP, who extracts a percentage of the
contract for 'administrative costs' before handing it to UNOPS, who then finds the appropriate local
subcontractors to implement the project.
7. Carrots or Sticks? Carrots.
a. Using time-bound projects with daily monetary incentives to finish early will ensure contractors stick
around to finish the projects.
b. In a conflict context, contractors either abandoning projects or dragging them on to benefit from
costs-plus contracts is a major hindrance to reconstruction work. However, it should be easier to
terminate a contractor mid-project. Since project expenditures with a non-performing contractor are
considered lost, it prevents contracting officers and managers from firing contractors since they would
have to hire another contractor for the same project with the remaining funds.
c. If you choose sticks, then enable a mobile DoJ outfit that can assess, investigate and prosecute
cases of contractor noncompliance in real time. The current timeline of USAID investigations is too
long. By the time USAID-OIG investigates a complaint or rumor of contractor corruption, assesses
its validity and refers it to DoJ for potential prosecution, it is often too late to have any impact on the
ongoing development projects. Contracting fraud is thus, not deterred by the threat of suspension,
debarment, fines or prosecution.
8. Prevent the hiring of "Broker Firms" from nearby countries such as Turkey and
Pakistan, many of which form just to win development contracts and then disappear
after collecting enough payments without completing the project.
a. Always demand a proportional billing for work done or a Bill of Quantity (BoQ). This will prevent firms
from allocating the majority of their budget on concrete, because once the foundation is laid and they
are paid, they can easily escape without completing the work. A BoQ allows the contracting officer
or manager to assess whether the contractor has allocated appropriate amount of funds for various
construction materials.
9. Fines, Suspensions, Debarments, Investigations and Indictments
a. If USAID wants to establish a thorough vetting process of contractors, then it must update its EPLS
database and integrate it with other state agencies like DoD, DoS and USACE who may be using the
same contractors and can thus, contribute to a shared pool of knowledge of contractor performance.
b. The integrated database suggested above that can record all instances of fines, suspensions, de-
barments, investigations and indictments of contractors must be made public knowledge for not only
the US taxpayer with ready internet access, but also for Afghan nationals.
c. Moreover, Afghan civilians or locally-appointed monitors should be able to contribute to the data-
base
CONCLUSION
The central query in this thesis-
whether the modern development enter-
prise and its contractors at war are account-
able to beneficiaries-is meant to call into
question the very nature and motivations of
the international development. The Ameri-
can development enterprise is a product
of the rise of the "contractor state" or "one
nation under contract." Though the obvi-
ous risks and downfalls brought on by the
overreliance on contractors have been care-
fully documented in the past decade, even
contracting's staunchest critics like Allison
Stanger believe that better management of
contractors or "smart-sourcing" can resolve
these issues.
It seems that this structural shift in
the way that the federal government op-
erates has been begrudgingly accepted
in academic and policy circles. But bet-
ter management strategies, no matter how
thorough, have not been able to address the
pivotal issue of who constitutes the "author-
ity" that citizens can hold to account. The
beneficiaries of postwar reconstruction proj-
ects are even further deprived of access to
information, participation and leverage that
could enable them to demand accountabil-
ity from a foreign power and hired contrac-
tors.
Not only has contracting in US policy
discourse been mostly criticized on behalf
of US taxpayers, but the discourse contin-
ues to ignore to the point of nullifying the
voice of beneficiaries. The impacts, both
positive and negative, of postwar recon-
struction and development projects cannot
be taken lightly. The ambitious and interven-
tionist security agenda that utilizes sloppy,
contractor-led development as a counter-
insurgency and stabilization tool is slowly
becoming institutionalized through the very
reform efforts that sought to challenge us-
ing contractors in war. Today, it is consid-
ered acceptable to use private security and
development contractors, albeit within an
adequate regulatory framework. Though
the security-development nexus has seen
many permutations during colonialism and
the cold war era, the present corporate in-
carnation is just as disturbing because the
private security and development industries
thrive in the dual categories of 'conflict' and
'underdevelopment.'
The project of increasing account-
ability to beneficiaries attempts to establish
a direct relationship between beneficiaries
and the for-profit contractors that are hired
to serve them. Just as American taxpayers
would like to know how their money is be-
ing spent, wouldn't Afghan civilians also like
the same information? Afghan civilians are
not customers of some free-market devel-
opment market who get to choose the con-
tractor and development agency that best
suits their needs and fits their budget. And
the modern development enterprise is not
much of an enterprise after all, because it
is selling an expensive, defective product
that no savvy consumer would willingly
purchase. This enterprise is currently being
subsidized by dollars earmarked for securi-
ty, without which American foreign aid fund-
ing will decline to low, peacetime levels.
The recommendations in the pre-
vious chapter are a mitigating response
to this very conundrum. Is it possible for
America to invest personnel and funds into
its premier development agency-USAID-
and actually set development goals that are
not subservient to foreign policy objectives?
Yes. But, in order to do that, beneficiaries
have to be empowered to hold agents of
development accountable, and if the time
comes, to even be able to say no, thank you
because American-style development is not
working for them.
Works Cited & Bibliography
Books
Carafano, James Jay. Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Conflict - Afghanistan, Iraq and
Future Conflicts. Praeger Security International, 2008
Chatterjee, Pratap. Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation. New York: Seven Stories Press: 2004, 77
-------- Halliburton's Army: How a Well-connected Texas Oil Company Revolutionized the Way
America Makes War. Nation Books, 2009
Duffield, Mark. Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. Polity,
2007, viii-ix
Isenberg, David. Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq. Westport: Praeger Security
International, 2009
Kamrany, Nake M. Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan: American and Soviet Models for Eco-
nomic Aid. Washington, DC: Communication Service Corporation, 1969
McKenna, Christopher. The World's Newest Profession. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2006
Patterson, Malcolm Hugh. Privatising Peace: A Corporate Adjunct to United Nations Peacekeep-
ing and Humanitarian Operations. Houndsmill: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009
Scahill, Jeremy. Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army. Nation
Books, 2008
Singer, Peter Warren. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2008
Smith, Daniel Jordan "The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria," in Robert 1.
Rotberg, Ed. Corruption, Global Security and World Order. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press,
2009
Stanger, Allison. One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future
of Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009
Articles
"Final Report." Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Volume 1, 26 August 2003. Accessed:
http://caib.nasa.gov/default.html
"OSCE 2004 Best Practices in Combating Corruption." Office of the Coordinator for Economic and
Environmental Activities, Vienna. www.osce.org/item/13568.html (Accessed 11 January 2011),
"Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity." Human Rights First. 2008
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/0811 5-usls-psc-final.pdf (Accessed 4 December 2010), 25
"Reconstructing Iraq," International Crisis Group. 2 September 2004. http://www.crisisgroup.
org/-/media/Files/Middle%20East%2ONorth %20Africa/Iraq%2OSyria%2OLebanon/Iraq/Recon-
structing%201raq.ashx (Accessed: 20 February 2011)
"The Politicisation of Humanitarian Action and Staff Security: The Use of Private Security Compa-
nies by Humanitarian Agencies." Summary Report of an International Workshop at Tufts Univer-
sity. 23-24 April 2001. www.internationalalert.org/pdf/Tuftrep.pdf
"Whose Aid is it Anyway? Politicizing Aid in Conflicts and Crises." Oxfam. 145 Oxfam Briefing
Paper. 10 February 2011. http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/whose-aid-it-anyway
Le Billon, Philippe. "Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts."
Journal of International Development. No. 15, 2003: 413-426
Boucher, Alix J., William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose and Jason Terry, "Mapping and
Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States." Stimson Centre Report No. 61. 1 March 2007. http://sel.
isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/93692/ipublicationdocument-singledocument/6267EED2-AF4E-
47CF-BA3D-ACAB47BDCC82/en/Report6l.pdf (Accessed: 9 January 2011)
Collier, Paul. "Development and Conflict." Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economies De-
partment of Economics, 1 October 2004
Dahl, Matthew C. "Soldiers of Fortune - Holding Private Security Contractors Accountable: The
Alien Torts Claims Act and its Potential Application to Abtan v. Blackwater USA." June 2008.
http://works.bepress.com/matthewdahl/1
Davis, Austen. "Concerning Accountability of Humanitarian Action." Humanitarian Practice Net-
work at ODI. No. 58, February 2007. http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2867
Denissen, Marieke. "Mutual Accountability in Afghanistan: Promoting Partnerships in Develop-
ment Aid?" Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Working Paper Series. April 2009
Deslegues, Lorenzo. "Integrity in Reconstruction-Afghan Roads Reconstruction: Deconstruction
of a Lucrative Assistance." Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 2007
Deslesgues, Lorenzo and Yama Torabi, "Bringing Accountability Back in: From Subjects of Aid to
Citizens of a State." Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 2008 http://www.iwaweb.org/reports/fromsub-
jectsofaidtocitizensofastate2008.html
Dubnick, M. J., "Seeking Salvation for Accountability," paper presented at the 2002 Annual Meet-
ing of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
Dubnick, Melvin J., and Barbara S. Romzek, 1993, 'Accountability and the Centrality of Expecta-
tions in American Public Administration', Research in Public Administration. Volume 2: 37-78.
Elsea, Jennifer K. "Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues." Congres-
sional Research Service. 7 January 2010, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf (Accessed 8
December 2010),
Galtung, Fredrik and Martin Tisn6, "A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction." Journal of De-
mocracy. Vol. 20: 4. October 2009, 93-107
Ghani, Ashraf, Michael Carnahan and Claire Lockhart, "Stability, State-Building and Development
Assistance: An Outside Perspective." Paper prepared for the Princeton Project on National Secu-
rity. 2005 http://www.princeton.edu/-ppns/papers.html
Ghani, Ashraf, Claire Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, "An Agenda for State-Building in the Twen-
ty-First Century." The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 30:1, Winter 2006.
Hoppe, Carsten and Ottavio Quirico, "Codes of Conduct for Private Military and Security Com-
panies: The State of Self-Regulation in the Industry." European University Institute. 2009 http://
cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1 814/12962 (Accessed 3 April 2011)
Kinley, David and Odette Murray, "Corporations that Kill: Prosecuting Blackwater." Sydney
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper. No. 10/129. November 2010. http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1711564.
Klitgaard, Robert E., Ronald MacLean-Abaroa and H. Lindsey Parris, Corrupt Cities: A Practical
Guide to Cure and Prevention. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2000
Ladbury, Sarah in collaboration with the Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU-Kabul), "Testing
Hypothesis on Radicalisation in Afghanistan: Why do Men Join the Taliban and Hizb-I Islami? How
Much do Local Communities Support them?" Independent Report for the Department of Interna-
tional Development (DFID). 14 August 2009, 8
Mulgan, Richard. "'Accountability': An Ever-Expanding Concept?" Public Administration. Vol. 78
No.3, 2000
Natsios, Andrew. "The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." Parameters. Autumn
2005. http://www.andrewnatsios.com/publications
Nye, Joseph S. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis." The American
Political Science Review. Vol. 61, No. 2
Perito, Robert M. "The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Les-
sons Identified." United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 152. October 2005
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. "From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and
the Expansion of International Institutions." Harvard International Law Journal. Vol. 41: 2, 2000,
529-578, 542
"-------- Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Rebuilding: A Critical Examination." William and
Mary Law Review. Vol. 49: 4, 2008, 1347-1376, 1352
Rimli, Lisa & Dr. Susanne Schmeidl, "Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Ex-
ploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola." Swiss Peace. November 2007. www.swisspeace.ch/
typo3/fileadmin/userupload/pdf/PSC.pdf (Accessed 8 December 2010)
Romzek, Barbara S. and Melvin J. Dubnick, "Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the
Challenger Tragedy." Public Administration Review. Vol. 47, No. 3, 227-238
Scharbatke-Church, Cheyanne and Kirby Reiling Eds, "Pilfering the Peace, Lilies that Fester: Seeds
of Corruption and Peacebuilding," New Routes by Life & Peace Institute, Available at: http://www.
life-peace.org/sajt/filer/pdf/NewRoutes/NR93_4.pdf
Schooner, Steven L. "Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law." Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 37. The George Washington University Law School,
2002. Accessed: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=304620
Schwartz, Moshe. "Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and
Analysis." Congressional Research Service. 2 July 2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
R40764.pdf (Accessed: 4 December 2010)
Spearin, Christopher. "What Manley Missed: The Human Security Implications of Private Security
in Afghanistan" in Security Privatization: Challenges and Opportunities. Human Security Bulletin.
Vol 6: 3, March 2008
Stanger, Allison. "Foreword," Contracting in Conflicts: The Path to Reform. Center for a New
American Security. 7 June 2010. www.cnas.org/node/4560 (Accessed: 2 December 2010), 3
Steer, Liesbet and Cecilie Wathne, "Mutual Accountability at Country Level: Emerging Good Prac-
tice." Overseas Development Institute. April 2009.
Torabi, Yama. "Assessing the NSP: The Role of Accountability in Reconstruction." Integrity Watch
Afghanistan. 2007
News Articles
"Current Members," International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. http://responsibility-
toprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition/current-members (Accessed: 16 February 2011)
"DynCorp International Acquires Casals & Associates." Press Release. Dyn-Intl.com. 25 January
2010. http://www.dyn-intl.com/news20l0/news0l2510-di-aquires-casals-associates.aspx
"Frequently Asked Questions about Corruption," Transparency International. www.transparency.
org/policyjresearch/surveys-indices/cpi/201 0/faqs (Accessed: 3 January 2011).
"Secretary-General Sets out Broad Agenda for Strengthening Human Protection." UN News Cen-
tre. 2 February 2011. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=37454&Cr=responsibility+
to+protect&Crl = (Accessed: 20 February 2011)
"USAID Suspends Academy for Educational Development from Receiving New U.S. Government
Awards." Press Release. USAID. 8 December 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2010/
pr101208.html (Accessed 19 February 2011)
"US Embassy Cables: Afghan Government asks US to Quash 'Dancing Boys' Scandal." Guard-
ian.co.uk. 2 December 2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-docu-
ments/213720
Arnoldy, Ben. "Afghanistan Corruption: How one Town Battled a Shoddy School and Won." CS-
Monitor.com. 20 August 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0820/
Afghanistan-corruption-How-one-town-battled-a-shoddy-school-and-won
Dilanian, Ken. "Short-staffed USAID tried to keep pace." USAToday.com. 1 February 2009. http://
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-01 -aid-insideN.htm
Hirsh, Michael. "Breaking the Silence." Newsweek.com. 22 March 2006. http://www.newsweek.
com/2006/03/21/breaking-the-silence.html
Montpetit, Jonathan. "Cda Military Pushing to Get Private Security Firms Licensed Ahead of
Deadline." The Canadian Press. 25 October 2010. http://www.news1130.com/news/national/
article/i 19639--cda-military-pushing-to-get-private-security-firm-licensed-ahead-of-deadline
Nakashima, Ellen. "Amid Reviews, DynCorp Bolsters Ethics Practices: Security Contractor Seeks
Future Work in Afghanistan." WashingtonPost.com. 27 July 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/26/AR2009072602358.htm
Priest, Dana and William M. Arkin, "National Security Inc." TheWashingtonPost.com 20 July
2010. www.projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/national-security-inc/print
Riechmann, Deb. "Gen. David Petraeus Issues Afghan Contracting Guidance." The Associated
Press. 13 September 2010. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39133494/ns/worldnews-south_
andcentral-asia/ (Accessed 21 February 2011)
Rubin, Alyssa J. "Afghanistan Softens Ban on Private Security Firms." NYTimes.com. 6 December
2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/asia/07afghan.html
Ryan, Missy. "Afghan Security Ban Seen Holding up $6 BIn in US Aid." AlertNet. 13 February
2011. http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/afghan-security-ban-seen-holding-up-6-bln-in-us-aid/
Salopek, Paul. "Casualties of South Africa's Silent War in Iraq - Desperation Drives Kin of Four
Abducted Mercenaries to Speak Out. An Exodus of Highly Paid Guns Alarms, Embarrasses Pre-
toria," L.A. Times October 14, 2007. http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/14/news/adfg-merce-
naryl 4 (Accessed 8 December 2010)
Sennott, C.M. "Taxpayer Money Funneled to Talibar." GlobalPost.com. 30 September 2010. www.
globalpost.com/print/5589160 (Accessed 27 November 2010)
Sullivan, Kevin. "Poor Salvadorans Chase the 'Iraqi Dream'." WashingtonTimes.com 9 December
2004 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49592-2004Dec8.html (Accessed 8 De-
cember 2010)
Waldman, Matt. "The Aid Afghanistan Really Needs." Guardian.co.uk. 8 July 2009. http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/08/afghanistan-taliban-insurgency-victory (Accessed 15
March 2011)
Speeches/Lectures
Kennedy, John F. "Remarks Upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act." 1 August 1962. http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8797#axzzl KseZVAVO
Shah, Rajiv. "The Modern Development Enterprise." Moderator: Nancy Birdsall. 19 January 2011.
http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2011/sp1 10119.html
Colonel Dan Anninos (Chief of Staff, USACE), "Reconstruction in Iraq: The Challenges, the Wins,
and the Losses." Security Studies Program Special Seminar at MIT. 14 April 2011.
BG Peter A. DeLuca, "Engineers in Service to the Nation." MIT, Center for International Studies
Lecture. 28 April 2011
Reports/Audits
UNDP
"Mutual Accountability Mechanisms: Accountability, Voice, and Responsiveness: A UNDP Capac-
ity Development Resource." UNDP Bureau for Development Policy. Working Draft of Conference
Paper No. 6. November 2006.
UN General Assembly
UN A/60/L.1 "World Summit 2005." United Nations General Assembly. 15 September 2005 http://
www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess20l 0/worldsummit.pdf (Accessed: 16 February 2011)
UN Working Group on Mercenaries
UN A/HRC/7/7 "Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violat-
ing Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination." 9
January 2008 http://www.unwg.rapn.ru/en/4/Annual%20Reports/2__G0810075.pdf (Accessed 4
December 2010),
USAID-OIG
George R. Jiron to Craig Buck (Dir. USAID/Afghanistan), "Memorandum: Risk Assessment of Major
Activities Managed by USAID/Afghanistan." Report No. 5-306-03-001-S. 11 March 2003. http://
www.usaid.gov/oig/afghanistanmemosify03.html
"Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Construction of Health and Education Facilities Program." USAID-
OG. Audit Report No. F-306-11-002-P. 27 March 2011.
"Memorandum: Review of Security Costs Charged to USAID Projects in Afghanistan." USAID-
OG. Review Report No. 5-306-10-002-S. 29 September 2010
"Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan." USAID-
OG. 21 May 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fylOrpts/5-306-10-009-p.pdf (Accessed 7
December 2010),
"Pakistan and Afghanistan." USAID-Office of Inspector General. October 2010, 54 www.usaid.
gov/oig/.../afghanistan-and-pakistanBooklet-FY201 0_4thquarter-final.pdf
CWC
"At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations." Congressio-
nal Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2nd Interim Report to Congress.
24 February 2011. http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/reports
"Ensuring Contractor Accountability: Past Performance and Suspension & Debarment." Transcript
of Commission for Wartime Contracting Hearing. 28 February 2011. Washington, D.C. http://www.
wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/hearings/commission/1 79-hearing2011-02-28
"IPOA Testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting." International Stability Opera-
tions Association. 14 September 2009. http://ipoaworld.org/eng/press/127-20090914ipoatesti-
monycwc.html (Accessed 11 December 2010)
DOD-OIG
"Report to Congress on Contracting Fraud." Department of Defense. January 2011 accessed
through "Release: Pentagon Spent Billions on Contractors that Committed Fraud." Bernie Sand-
ers: US Senator for Vermont. Sanders.senate.gov 2 February 2011. http://sanders.senate.gov/
newsroom/news/?id=2B80052E-9401 -4B96-989C-84D506B76DEB (Accessed 21 February 2011)
GAO
"USAID Relies Heavily on Nongovernmental Organizations, but Better Data Needed to Evaluate
Approaches." Government Accountability Office. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Na-
tional Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives. GAO-02-471. April 2002 www.gao.gov/new.items/d02471.pdf
SIGAR
"DOD, State, USAID Obligated over $17.7 Billion to About 7,000 Contractors and Other Entities
for Afghanistan Reconstruction During Fiscal Years 2007 and 2009." Office of the Special Inspec-
tor General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 27 October 2010. http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/
SIGAR%20Audit-1 1-4.pdf (Accessed: 17 February 2011)
SIGIR
"Plans to Preserve Iraq Reconstruction Program and Contract Records Need to be Improved."
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 30 July 2010. http://www.sigir.mil/
files/audits/1 0-021.pdf#view=fit (Accessed: 17 February 2011)
UN-WORKING GROUP ON MERCENARIES
"Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination." UN A/HRC/10/1 4/Add. 2 .
19 February 2009 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/111/70/PDF/G0911170.
pdf?OpenElement (Accessed 4 December 2010),
DAI
"To Provide Alternative Livelihoods to Poppy Cultivation." AINP. Development Alternatives Inc. 31
February 2006
"The First 40: A History of DAI." DAI.COM. http://www.dai.com/pdf/DAI-HISTORY-BOOK.pdf
(Accessed: February 17 2011)
